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INTERROGATION AND THE ROBERTS COURT 
Jonathan Witmer-Rich* 
Abstract 
 
Through 2010, the Roberts Court decided five cases involving the 
rules for police interrogation under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments: 
Kansas v. Ventris; Montejo v. Louisiana; Florida v. Powell; Maryland 
v. Shatzer; and Berghuis v. Thompkins. This Article argues that these 
decisions show the Roberts Court reshaping constitutional interrogation 
rules according to a new (as-yet unarticulated) principle: “fair play” in 
interrogations. The Warren Court believed that suspects in police 
interrogation were vulnerable to inherent compelling pressures; the 
Court correspondingly created procedural interrogation rules under the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments (Miranda and Massiah) to protect 
suspects. The Roberts Court does not share that motivating concern. But 
rather than overruling Miranda and Massiah, the Court is reanimating 
those doctrines according to the new principle of “fair play” in 
interrogations. This “fair play” rubric presupposes interrogation 
suspects who are autonomous agents, expected to know and protect 
their rights. 
Part I describes how the Roberts Court’s Fifth Amendment decisions 
are best explained by the new rubric of “fair play” in interrogations. Part 
II does the same for the Court’s Sixth Amendment decisions. Part III 
evaluates this new “fair play” rubric, concluding that it is not a fair and 
adequate principle for organizing constitutional interrogation doctrine. 
While the Warren Court’s specific rules and remedies for interrogation 
law have been criticized over the years from both the left and the right, 
its underlying premise—that suspects facing police interrogation are 
vulnerable to abuse and overreaching—has proven robust and continues 
to find support in decades of empirical work. The Roberts Court’s 
presumption that suspects in interrogation are autonomous agents 
capable of protecting their own interests is wrong. The resulting rules of 
“fair play” in interrogation fail to adequately protect the constitutional 
right against self-incrimination and the guarantee of the assistance of 
counsel in all criminal cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the first five years since Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. 
assumed his duties on September 29, 2005, the Supreme Court issued 
five decisions involving constitutional limitations on police 
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interrogation: Kansas v. Ventris;1 Montejo v. Louisiana;2 Florida v. 
Powell;3 Maryland v. Shatzer;4 and Berghuis v. Thompkins.5 All five 
decisions limit the protections for interrogation suspects and broaden 
police interrogation powers, under either the Fifth Amendment or the 
Sixth Amendment.6 While the ongoing erosion of the Warren Court’s 
interrogation protections is nothing new,7 these five decisions show the 
Roberts Court reshaping interrogation law based on a new underlying 
principle: “fair play.”  
The purpose animating the Warren Court’s interrogation rules was to 
                                                                                                                     
 1. 129 S. Ct. 1841 (2009). 
 2. 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009). 
 3. 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010). 
 4. 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010). 
 5. 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).  
 6. The Roberts Court also decided one statutory interrogation decision, Corley v. United 
States, 129 S. Ct. 1558 (2009). In Corley, the only defense win of the Roberts Court 
interrogation cases, the Court decided that Congress intended to limit, but not eliminate, the 
McNabb-Mallory rule: that “an arrested person’s confession is inadmissible if given after an 
unreasonable delay in bringing him before a judge.” Id. at 1562  
(citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 
449 (1957)). As a statutory interpretation case, Corley is subject to modification by Congress. 
Moreover, the majority opinion is squarely aimed at achieving Congress’s intent in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3501 (2006), and it does not reveal much about the Justices’ underlying theories of 
constitutional interrogation rules.  
Notably, all five Roberts Court constitutional interrogation decisions were issued in the 
2009 or 2010 terms, after Justice Alito assumed his duties on January 31, 2006. Thus, all five 
decisions were issued under the watch of the present “conservative” wing of the Roberts 
Court—Justices Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito—along with swing vote Justice Kennedy. 
Justice Sotomayor assumed office on August 8, 2009, replacing Justice Souter. Justice Souter 
participated in all of the 2009 decisions: Corley (majority opinion written by Justice Souter), 
Ventris, and Montejo. Justice Sotomayor participated in all of the 2010 decisions: Powell, 
Shatzer, and Thompkins. Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer participated in all six decisions. 
Justice Stevens was the only justice who did not join the majority in any of the five 
constitutional interrogation decisions. Justice Kagan replaced Justice Stevens in the fall of 2010, 
after the Roberts Court’s 2009–2010 interrogation decisions were handed down.  
On June 16, 2011, the Court decided J.D.B. v. North Carolina, No. 09-11121 (2011), 
holding that when police interrogate a minor child, that child’s age properly influences the 
question of whether that child is in “custody” for Miranda purposes. Because J.D.B. was 
decided while this article was being prepared for printing, this Article does not include J.D.B. in 
its analysis.  
 7. See, e.g., Arthur J. Goldberg, Escobedo and Miranda Revisited, 18 AKRON L. REV. 
177, 180 (1984) (arguing “that the Court is determined to limit or overrule Miranda by 
erosion”); Leslie A. Lunney, The Erosion of Miranda: Stare Decisis Consequences, 48 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 727, 727–28 (1999) (arguing that the Court has “pretend[ed] to abide by Miranda while 
eviscerating its substance”); Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A 
Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1841 (1987) (“Although the Court as 
yet has given no indication that it is willing to take the more controversial step of overruling 
Miranda, it has deeply eroded the foundation of the doctrine, leaving Miranda almost useless in 
its present application.”).  
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protect vulnerable suspects from overbearing police pressures during 
interrogation.8 The Roberts Court decisions pay lip service to that 
concern but cannot really be explained by it. For some time now, 
commentators have observed that the Supreme Court instead seems to 
be shaping interrogation law to facilitate the admission of custodial 
confessions, by creating “safe harbor” rules that are relatively clear and 
simple for police to satisfy.9 Miranda v. Arizona’s10 original motivating 
purpose—protecting vulnerable suspects—appears to have entirely 
vanished, prompting a number of academic-style funerals for 
Miranda.11 The five Roberts Court interrogation decisions seem to 
continue this trend. 
But while the Roberts Court continues the trend of draining Miranda 
and its sister decision, Massiah v. United States,12 of their original 
motivating impetus, it has not overtly abolished or overruled these 
doctrines. On the contrary, the Court continues to reaffirm the ongoing 
vitality of Miranda and Massiah.13 If the original spirit of constitutional 
interrogation law has been drained away, what new spirit now animates 
the doctrinal corpus? Each of the five Roberts Court interrogation 
decisions involves a different area of interrogation law, and none on its 
                                                                                                                     
 8. The landmark Warren Court interrogation decisions—most notably Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and its progeny, but also Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 
(1964) and its progeny—created a regime of Fifth and Sixth Amendment interrogation rules 
founded on the view that criminal suspects undergoing police interrogation faced serious 
pressures that threatened to “exact[] a heavy toll on individual liberty and trade[] on the 
weakness of individuals[,]” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455, which is “destructive of human dignity.” 
Id. at 457. The Court’s decisions were accordingly motivated by a desire to “dispel the 
compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings.” Id. at 458. 
 9. See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A 
FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 45 (1991) (“[M]ost professional law-enforcement organizations had 
learned to live with Miranda, and even to love it, to the extent that it provided them with a safe 
harbor . . . .”); Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe 
Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 
1033 (2001) (“[A] ‘constitutional safe harbor rule’ is a judicially created procedure that, if 
properly followed by the government actor, insulates the government from the argument that the 
constitutional clause at issue was violated.”). 
 10. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 11. Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to 
Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 24 (2010) (“Miranda has effectively been overruled.”); 
Sandra Guerra Thompson, Evading Miranda: How Seibert and Patane Failed to “Save” 
Miranda, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 645, 647 (2006) (“Seibert and Patane represent the coup de grace 
for the demise of Miranda.”); Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CAL. L. REV. 
1519, 1521 (2008) (“Miranda is largely dead.”). 
 12. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
 13. Most notably, the Court declined the chance to overrule Miranda in Dickerson v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000). The five decisions discussed herein do not suggest 
Miranda will be overruled; on the contrary, some discuss the many Miranda protections that 
remain in force. See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2090 (2009). 
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face claims to be interconnected by any unifying theme. But all five can 
be explained by a single, unacknowledged principle: “fair play” in 
interrogation.  
The Roberts Court’s principle of “fair play” treats suspects as 
autonomous, empowered individuals who possess the knowledge and 
wherewithal to assert and protect their rights and interests. A suspect 
who police interrogate must receive “fair notice” of his rights, but not 
much more (Powell and Thompkins). A charged, represented defendant 
must not be unfairly deprived of the equalizing protections of counsel in 
interrogations, but the defendant also will not be permitted to unfairly 
game the system by taking the stand at trial and testifying in conflict 
with an earlier statement (Ventris). A willing suspect will not be 
protected from (often unwisely) talking to the police, but a suspect will 
be entitled to protection from excessive “badgering” by police once she 
has made clear her desire to assert her rights (Shatzer and possibly 
Montejo).  
The spirit that animated the Warren Court’s decisions in Miranda 
and Massiah—protecting vulnerable suspects from police coercion—
has died. But the name and mantle of Miranda and Massiah live on, 
with a still central place in constitutional interrogation law. The Roberts 
Court is reanimating Miranda and Massiah with a new and wholly 
different spirit: creating rules for “fair play” in interrogation that 
facilitate the admissibility of custodial confessions at trial. The death of 
a sovereign monarch prompts the proclamation, “The king is dead! 
Long live the king!”—a recognition that the royal mantle survives the 
death of its holder and the name “king” becomes animated by a new 
person.14 The same proclamation fits this moment of constitutional 
transition, in which the original spirit of Miranda is gone but a new 
spirit now animates it: Miranda is dead! Long live Miranda!15 
Parts I and II are descriptive. Part I addresses the three Fifth 
Amendment decisions—Powell, Thompkins, and Shatzer—and explains 
how each decision reflects the principle of “fair play” in interrogation. 
Part II does the same for the Sixth Amendment decisions—Montejo and 
Ventris. After Montejo’s overruling of Michigan v. Jackson,16 Sixth 
Amendment interrogation law features many new, open questions. Part 
II thus also predicts some of the future terrain of Sixth Amendment 
                                                                                                                     
 14. The origin of the phrase is French: Le roi est mort! Vive le roi!, which appears at least 
as early as 1611, in a French manual of legal maxims. See RALPH E. GEISEY, THE ROYAL 
FUNERAL CEREMONY IN RENAISSANCE FRANCE 182 (1960). The declaration signifies “the idea 
that, though the physical body of the king may die . . . kingship is eternal.” DAVID POTTER, A 
HISTORY OF FRANCE, 1460–1560: THE EMERGENCE OF A NATION STATE 42 (1995).   
 15. Like observers of a transition in the monarchy, we might proclaim this in joy and 
celebration, in fear and mourning, or with mixed emotions, depending on our opinions about the 
passing regime as compared to its successor. 
 16. 475 U.S. 625 (1985). 
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interrogation law, using the principle of “fair play.”  
Part III evaluates whether “fair play” in interrogations, as reflected 
in the Roberts Court decisions, is indeed a fair and adequate principle 
for organizing constitutional interrogation doctrine. I conclude that it is 
not. The Warren Court’s decisions creating specific rules and remedies 
for interrogation law have been heavily criticized from both the right 
and the left.17 But the underlying premise—that suspects facing police 
interrogation are vulnerable to abuse and overreaching—has proven 
robust and continues to find support in decades of empirical work. The 
Roberts Court’s presumption that a suspect in interrogation is an 
autonomous agent capable of protecting his interests is wrong. The 
resulting rules based on “fair play” in interrogation fail to adequately 
protect the constitutional right against self-incrimination and the 
guarantee of the assistance of counsel in all criminal cases.  
I.  CHANGING RULES FOR FIFTH AMENDMENT INTERROGATION: 
PROVIDING “FAIR NOTICE,” NOT DISPELLING COERCION  
The Roberts Court issued three Fifth Amendment interrogation 
decisions, one touching on each of the three central components of the 
Miranda regime: warnings (Florida v. Powell), waivers (Berghuis v. 
Thompkins), and invocations (Maryland v. Shatzer). In Florida v. 
Powell, the Court continued its pattern of permitting Miranda warnings 
that put a suspect on notice of his basic rights to silence and counsel, 
even though those warnings do not track Miranda’s language exactly 
and may not fully inform a suspect of every aspect of those rights. The 
Court is satisfied so long as suspects receive “fair notice” of their rights, 
regardless of whether suspects are actually empowered by that notice or 
whether the coercive interrogation atmosphere is meaningfully 
dispelled.   
In Berghuis v. Thompkins, the Court effectively eliminated the 
                                                                                                                     
 17. Some have criticized from the right that Miranda was constitutionally unjustified and 
is too costly. See, e.g., JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 199–222 (1993); 
Ronald J. Allen, Miranda’s Hollow Core, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 71, 73 (2006); Paul G. Cassell, 
Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 387, 391 (1996); Paul 
G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda’s 
Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1060 (1998); Joseph D. Grano, 
Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 NW. U. L. 
REV. 100, 153 (1986). Others have criticized from the left that the Warren Court correctly 
diagnosed the problem but prescribed an inadequate and ineffective set of rules to remedy it. 
See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 
99 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1026–27 (2001); George C. Thomas III, Miranda’s Illusion: Telling 
Stories in the Police Interrogation Room, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1091, 1092, 1103–04 (2003) 
(reviewing WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION 
PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON (2001)) (“[B]y most accounts, Miranda has been a spectacular 
failure.”). 
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“affirmative waiver” requirement from Miranda. As in Powell, the 
Court spent little effort ensuring that the coercive effects of custodial 
interrogation are dispelled; instead, the Court put the onus on suspects 
to protect themselves once they have received “fair notice” of their 
interrogation rights. 
In Maryland v. Shatzer, the Court limited how long a suspect’s 
Miranda invocation of the right to counsel lasts: the invocation now 
lasts fourteen days after release from Miranda custody. Of the three 
cases, Shatzer speaks most in Miranda’s language of dispelling 
potential coercion. Shatzer, in particular, recognized the danger in 
police “badgering” a suspect to give up her rights after the suspect has 
initially asserted them. Somewhat remarkably for a Court seemingly 
intent on weakening what it has called the Warren Court’s 
“prophylactic” rules—rules the Court has said are not part of the 
Constitution itself but which are designed to preventatively protect 
against violations of constitutional rights—the Shatzer Court created a 
new fourteen-day “prophylactic” rule to satisfy its antibadgering 
concern. Only Justice Clarence Thomas, partly concurring, would 
eliminate even this protection. 
Taken together, these three decisions illustrate the emerging shape 
of the Fifth Amendment’s interrogation rules when reformulated to 
reflect “fair play” in interrogation. 
A.  Florida v. Powell and Berghuis v. Thompkins: Transforming 
Miranda into a “Fair Notice” Right 
While Powell and Thompkins relate to different aspects of the 
Miranda regime, both decisions reflect a broader theme: a Court 
unconcerned with protecting vulnerable suspects from the pressures of 
custodial interrogation and satisfied so long as police give a suspect 
“fair notice” of his rights.  
1.  Florida v. Powell 
In Florida v. Powell, the first interrogation case of the Roberts 
Court’s October 2009 term, the Court continued its pattern of approving 
Miranda warnings that deviate from the precise language articulated in 
Miranda itself, a trend bemoaned by many commentators,18 with 
                                                                                                                     
 18. See, e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown, Drugs, Ideology, and the Deconstitutionalization of 
Criminal Procedure, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 47 (1992) (“To the extent that Prysock and Eagan are 
utilized, either intentionally or inadvertently, the effectiveness of Miranda as an insulator is 
undercut.”); Paul Marcus, A Return to the “Bright Line Rule” of Miranda, 35 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 93, 129 (1993) (“No deviation from Miranda should be allowed unless the government 
clearly can demonstrate that the deviation would not lead to confusion regarding the required 
warnings, a difficult burden to sustain and certainly one that the government could not have 
sustained in either Prysock or Duckworth.”); Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A 
7
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apparently little effect on the Court.19 The Court had previously 
approved variations from the exact language of Miranda in California v. 
Prysock20 and Duckworth v. Eagan.21 Those decisions, Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg wrote, “inform our judgment here” in Powell.22  
In Prysock, the “officer informed the suspect of his right to a 
lawyer’s presence during questioning and his right to counsel appointed 
at no cost,” but did not explain “that the appointment of an attorney 
would occur prior to the impending interrogation.”23 The Court held that 
these warnings were constitutionally sufficient, as the warnings did not 
suggest “any limitation on the right to the presence of appointed 
counsel.”24 In Duckworth, the officer informed the suspect of the right 
to counsel during the interrogation and the right to an appointed 
attorney, but added that the attorney would be appointed “if and when 
you go to court.”25 The Court, noting that this statement accurately 
described the procedure under state law (a lawyer would first be 
appointed at the first court appearance), held that this addition “simply 
anticipates [a] question” the suspect may well ask.26 Again, the Court 
held the warning was constitutionally sufficient. 
In the wake of Prysock and Duckworth, a circuit split developed on 
one particular feature of the Miranda warning: whether the warning 
needed to inform the accused that he not only had a right to counsel, but 
that he had a right to counsel during police questioning. Before Powell, 
                                                                                                                     
Modest Proposal for the Abolition of Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C. L. REV. 69, 88 (1989) 
(“[A]fter Duckworth, the warnings designed to advise defendants of their rights may instead be 
used to mislead them and to induce ignorant waivers.”); Thompson, supra note 11, at 
657 (stating that cases like Prysock or Duckworth “have indeed turned Miranda’s ‘safeguards’ 
into a minor formality that is not likely to impede the path to interrogation and may in fact be a 
useful interrogation tool” (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974))); Michael L. 
Scheier, Case Note, Miranda Warnings and Habeas Corpus: The Supreme Court’s Erosion of 
Prisoners’ Fifth Amendment Rights in Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989), 59 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 261, 282 (1990). But see Eugene R. Milhizer, Rethinking Police Interrogation: 
Encouraging Reliable Confessions While Respecting Suspects’ Dignity, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 
97–98 (2006) (proposing a revised Miranda warning and relying on Prysock and Duckworth as 
support for the flexibility the Court has allowed in formulating Miranda warnings); Lawrence 
Rosenthal, Against Orthodoxy: Miranda Is Not Prophylactic and the Constitution Is Not Perfect, 
10 CHAP. L. REV. 579, 598 (2007) (defending Prysock and Duckworth as consistent with the 
point that “any advice that enables a suspect to make a knowing and intelligent decision about 
Fifth Amendment rights will comport with constitutional standards”).  
 19. The Powell majority does not cite or address any of the academic criticism of its past 
decisions in this area. 
 20. 453 U.S. 355, 355–56 (1981) (per curiam). 
 21. 492 U.S. 195, 200–01 (1989). 
 22. Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1204 (2010). 
 23. Id. (citing Prysock, 453 U.S. at 356–59). 
 24. Prysock, 453 U.S. at 360–61. 
 25. Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 197–98. 
 26. Id. at 204.  
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“[t]he Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits . . . interpreted Miranda to 
require an explicit warning of the right to have counsel present during 
questioning.”27 In contrast, “the Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth 
Circuits [did] not require the police to explicitly inform the suspect of 
his right to have counsel present during the interrogation to satisfy 
Miranda requirements.”28 Commentators urged the Supreme Court to 
resolve this issue, and the Court did so in Powell.29  
In Powell, the officers informed Powell that he had “the right to talk 
to a lawyer before answering any . . . questions,” that if he could not 
afford a lawyer, “one [would] be appointed for [him] without cost and 
before any questioning[,]” and that he had “the right to use any of these 
rights at any time [he] want[ed] during this interview.”30 The Court, in a 
7-2 opinion by Justice Ginsburg, held that these warnings “reasonably 
conveyed Powell’s right to have an attorney present, not only at the 
outset of interrogation, but at all times.”31  
In Powell, as in Prysock and Duckworth, the Court did not narrow 
the substance of the warnings required by Miranda. For example, the 
Court did not hold that the warnings need not convey the suspect’s right 
to have counsel present “during the interrogation.” Instead, the Court 
reiterated that “[t]he four warnings Miranda requires are invariable,” 
but the specific words required to convey that “essential information” 
                                                                                                                     
 27. Daria K. Boxer, Comment, Miranda with Precision: Why the Current Circuit Split 
Should Be Solved in Favor of a Uniform Requirement of an Explicit Miranda Warning of the 
Right to Have Counsel Present During Interrogation, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 425, 425 (2008) (citing 
United States v. Tillman, 963 F.2d 137, 140–42 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Noti, 731 F.2d 
610, 615 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Anthon, 648 F.2d 669, 672–74 (10th Cir. 1981); 
Atwell v. United States, 398 F.2d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 1968)). 
 28. Id. at 425–26 (citing United States v. Frankson, 83 F.3d 79, 81–82 (4th Cir. 1996); 
United States v. Caldwell, 954 F.2d 496, 501–04 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Adams, 484 
F.2d 357, 361–62 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Vanterpool, 394 F.2d 697, 698–99 (2d Cir. 
1968)). 
 29. Before Powell, some commentators urged the Court to resolve the split by requiring 
an explicit warning of the right to counsel during police interrogation. See Adam S. Bazelon, 
Comment, Adding (or Reaffirming) a Temporal Element to the Miranda Warning “You Have the 
Right to an Attorney,” 90 MARQ. L. REV. 1009, 1010 (2007) (arguing “that both the Fifth 
Amendment and Miranda dictate that a suspect must be explicitly made aware of the right to 
have an attorney present during interrogation”); Boxer, supra note 27, at 426 (“An explicit 
warning of the right to have an attorney present during the actual interrogation is essential to the 
proper functioning of the Miranda safeguards . . . .”). Others argued that “a suspect’s confession 
[should] not be excluded from evidence merely because police fail to expressly inform him of 
his right to have counsel present during police questioning.” Derek Bottcher, Note, Bridgers v. 
Dretke: Not Everything You Say Can and Will Be Used Against You, 18 GEO. MASON U. C.R. 
L.J. 359, 387 (2008).  
 30. Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1200 (2010) (quoting Joint Appendix at 3, Powell, 
130 S. Ct. 1195 (No. 08-1175)). 
 31. Id. at 1205. 
9
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are not.32 The Court held that Miranda did require a warning that 
“reasonably conveyed” to the suspect the right to have counsel present 
during the interrogation, but also held that Florida’s warning—which 
did not explicitly so state—“communicated [that] same essential 
message.”33 
 One of the most notable features of the Powell opinion is the 
absence of any reference to the growing body of empirical research on 
suspects’ poor comprehension of various versions of Miranda warnings. 
Professor Charles D. Weisselberg, noting the Court’s trend of approving 
variations on Miranda warnings without regard to “whether officers 
phrased them in language that defendants can really understand[,]” 
recently concluded that “[t]he best evidence is now that a significant 
percentage of suspects simply cannot comprehend the warnings or the 
rights they are intended to convey.”34 In the Powell litigation, a number 
of briefs in support of Respondent Powell pointed the Court directly to 
this evidence; for instance, the amicus brief of the Florida Association 
of Criminal Defense Lawyers relied heavily on studies showing the 
relatively poor literacy and comprehension skills of criminal suspects, 
as well as studies showing relatively poor levels of comprehension of 
Miranda rights. That amicus brief noted that since Miranda, “numerous 
studies have examined whether criminal defendants are, in fact, 
understanding their Miranda rights.”35 The brief also noted that “the one 
conclusion on which all of the studies agree is that the clarity of 
Miranda warnings matters.”36  
The Supreme Court did not dispute the quality of these studies, 
discuss other reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, or explain 
them away in some other fashion. Instead, the Court disregarded the 
studies entirely. The Court’s failure to cite or discuss these empirical 
studies suggests that the Court is not primarily interested in whether 
suspects actually comprehend the substance of the Miranda warnings. 
Instead, as discussed at greater length below, the Court is simply trying 
to ensure that suspects receive “fair notice” of their rights, without 
concerning itself with whether that notice actually dispels any inherent 
                                                                                                                     
 32. Id. at 1204. 
 33. Id. at 1205–06. 
 34. Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 1563–64. 
 35. Brief for the Florida Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondent at 6, Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (No. 08-1175) (citing Richard Rogers, A 
Little Knowledge Is a Dangerous Thing . . . Emerging Miranda Research and Professional Roles 
for Psychologists, 63 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 776, 777 (2008); Richard Rogers et al., An Analysis of 
Miranda Warnings and Waivers: Comprehension and Coverage, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 177, 
178–79 (2007); and Richard Rogers et al., The Language of Miranda Warnings in American 
Jurisdictions: A Replication and Vocabulary Analysis, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 124, 125–26 
(2008)). 
 36. Id. 
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coercion in custodial interrogation. 
2.  Berghuis v. Thompkins 
In Berghuis v. Thompkins, the Court addressed the “waiver” prong of 
Miranda, holding that “[w]here the prosecution shows that a Miranda 
warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an 
accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the 
right to remain silent.”37 In addition, the Court held that “after giving a 
Miranda warning, police may interrogate a suspect who has neither 
invoked nor waived his or her Miranda rights”—that is, if a suspect has 
not affirmatively invoked his right to remain silent, the police do not 
need to obtain a waiver before they begin to question the suspect.38 In 
these two parts of Thompkins, the Court completed the ongoing 
rejection of several key parts of the original Miranda decision. 
In Miranda, the Court stated fairly explicitly that a suspect would 
have to affirmatively waive his right to silence and right to counsel 
before police could obtain an admissible confession. The Court stated, 
“a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the 
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-
incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel[,]” and “a 
valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the 
accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a 
confession was in fact eventually obtained.”39  
Professor Yale Kamisar has noted that “[a]lthough ‘[t]he tone and 
language of the majority opinion in Miranda seemed to indicate that the 
Court would be receptive to nothing short of an express waiver of the 
rights involved,’ the post-Warren Court settled for less—far less.”40 The 
Court soon began to retreat from its strong language in North Carolina 
v. Butler,41 holding that “[a]n express written or oral statement of 
waiver . . . is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish 
waiver.”42 The Court said, “mere silence is not enough” to waive 
Miranda rights, but it may be possible that “the defendant’s silence, 
coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct 
indicating waiver,” might “support a conclusion that a defendant has 
                                                                                                                     
 37. 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2261–62 (2010). 
 38. Id. at 2264. 
 39. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). 
 40. Yale Kamisar, On the Fortieth Anniversary of the Miranda Case: Why We Needed It, 
How We Got It—And What Happened to It, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 163, 180 (2007) (quoting 2 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 580 (2d ed. 
1999)). 
 41.  441 U.S. 369 (1979). 
 42. Id. at 373. 
11
Witmer-Rich: Interrogation and the Roberts Court
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
1200 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
waived his rights.”43 Thompkins goes a significant step further, holding 
that the suspect’s answer to a question—that is, the confession itself 
(the single word “yes” in Thompkins)44—can constitute the “course of 
conduct indicating waiver” referenced in Butler.45  
In the wake of Butler, commentators argued that any “affirmative 
waiver” requirement effectively had been eliminated. As early as 1988, 
Professor Mark Berger observed, “In practice, it appears that as long as 
the warnings are given and the suspect exhibits no overt signs of a lack 
of capacity to understand them, his waiver will be upheld.”46 Professor 
George C. Thomas III reaffirmed this description more recently. Based 
on his “reading [of] hundreds of appellate opinions deciding whether 
the police complied with Miranda[,]” he concludes that “once the 
prosecutor proves that the warnings were given in a language that the 
suspect understands,” courts find a Miranda waiver if “the suspect 
answered police questions after saying that he understood the 
warnings.”47 From my point of view as a criminal defense lawyer from 
2006 through 2009, there was a bit more left of the “waiver” 
requirement in those years than Berger and Thomas claim, although it is 
certainly true that Butler had significantly eased the prosecutor’s 
burden. A case like Thompkins, in which the defendant had not said 
anything remotely resembling a waiver before confessing, would have 
been subject to a robust suppression motion. The admissibility of the 
confession would have been uncertain, and there is a good chance the 
prosecutor would have offered a favorable plea bargain to avoid 
litigating the issue.48 But that is now a historical debate. After 
Thompkins, Thomas’s description of Miranda “practice” is now 
formally a part of the Court’s black-letter law: “Where the prosecution 
shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by 
the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied 
waiver of the right to remain silent.”49 
 In Thompkins, police in Ohio arrested Van Chester Thompkins, a 
suspect in a shooting that had occurred about a year earlier in 
                                                                                                                     
 43. Id. 
 44.  Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2257 (2010). 
 45. Id. at 2263 (quoting Butler, 441 U.S. at 373) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 46. Mark Berger, Compromise and Continuity: Miranda Waivers, Confession 
Admissibility, and the Retention of Interrogation Protections, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 1007, 1063 
(1988). 
 47. George C. Thomas III, Separated at Birth but Siblings Nonetheless: Miranda and the 
Due Process Notice Cases, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1082 (2001). 
 48. The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Thompkins is one example that the waiver requirement 
still retained some vitality. In the decision reversed by the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit had 
held that Thompkins had not waived his Miranda rights and thus was entitled to habeas relief. 
Thompkins v. Berghuis, 547 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010). 
 49. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2262. 
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Southfield, Michigan. Southfield police arrived in Ohio and interrogated 
Thompkins for about three hours, starting around 1:30 p.m. The officers 
presented Thompkins with a Miranda form, had him read one of the 
warnings aloud, and then read him the remaining warnings.50 
Thompkins did not sign a waiver form, never orally stated that he would 
waive his rights, and never said anything along the lines of, “I will talk 
to you.”51 Nor did Thompkins affirmatively invoke his right to silence 
or right to counsel. Instead, Thompkins was “‘[l]argely’ silent during 
the interrogation,” giving a “few limited verbal responses . . . such as 
‘yeah,’ ‘no,’ or ‘I don’t know.’”52 He nodded his head a few times, and 
once said he “‘didn’t want a peppermint’ that was offered to him by the 
police and that the chair he was ‘sitting in was hard.’”53  
 The Court described the critical part of the interrogation as follows: 
About 2 hours and 45 minutes into the interrogation, 
[Detective] Helgert asked Thompkins, “Do you believe in 
God?” Thompkins made eye contact with Helgert and said 
“Yes,” and his eyes “well[ed] up with tears.” Helgert asked, 
“Do you pray to God?” Thompkins said, “Yes.” Helgert 
asked, “Do you pray to God to forgive you for shooting that 
boy down?” Thompkins answered “Yes” and looked 
away.54 
Thompkins declined to make a written confession, and the interrogation 
ended soon after.55 
 In a 5-4 opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that 
Thompkins had waived his right to remain silent. Noting Butler’s 
holding that some “course of conduct” on the part of the suspect might 
indicate waiver, the Court held that Thompkins’ answer “Yes” was 
itself enough: “Thompkins’s answer to [Detective] Helgert’s question 
about praying to God for forgiveness for shooting the victim [is] 
sufficient to show a course of conduct indicating waiver [of the right to 
remain silent].”56 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court asserted that “[t]he main 
purpose of Miranda is to ensure that an accused is advised of and 
understands the right to remain silent and the right to counsel.”57 Thus, 
instead of referring to the “inherent coercion” of custodial interrogation, 
                                                                                                                     
 50. Id. at 2256. 
 51. Cf. Butler, 441 U.S. at 371 (finding a Miranda waiver for a suspect who said, “I will 
talk to you but I am not signing any form”). 
 52. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2256. 
 53. Id. at 2256–57. 
 54. Id. at 2257 (citations omitted). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 2263. 
 57. Id. at 2261. 
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the majority described Miranda’s purpose as informational: providing a 
suspect with notice of her rights. The Thompkins majority’s only 
reference to the “inherent coercion” of the interrogation room is a 
quotation of Moran v. Burbine to the effect that the informational 
aspects of Miranda—delivering the warnings—fully dispel any 
coercion: “But ‘as Miranda holds, full comprehension of the rights to 
remain silent and request an attorney are sufficient to dispel whatever 
coercion is inherent in the interrogation process.’”58 
Thompkins also argued that “even if his answer to Detective Helgert 
could constitute a waiver of his right to remain silent, the police were 
not allowed to question him until they obtained a waiver first.”59 This 
argument—like the requirement of an affirmative waiver—finds good 
support in Miranda itself. As Charles Weisselberg noted, “The Miranda 
Court assumed that warnings would be given and waivers obtained 
prior to the start of questioning or the application of the tactics 
described in the Miranda opinion.”60 The Thompkins Court expressly 
found the contrary, reasoning that “‘the primary protection afforded 
suspects subject[ed] to custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings 
themselves.’”61 Accordingly, police must first “have given the accused a 
Miranda warning.”62 Once the warning has been given, however, 
“police may interrogate a suspect who has neither invoked nor waived 
his or her Miranda rights,” and see whether the suspect eventually 
provides an “express or implied waiver.”63 Given the Court’s ruling that 
simply answering a question after nearly three hours of questioning can 
itself be an implied waiver, this holding means that for a suspect who 
has neither waived nor invoked her rights, the police can continue to 
interrogate her until she confesses. 
Commentators have long noted that Miranda’s protective regime 
consists, at its core, of two elements: warnings and waivers.64 The 
                                                                                                                     
 58. Id. at 2260 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986)). Contrast this with 
the dissent in Thompkins, which takes pains to emphasize that Miranda is “premised on the idea 
that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive,” so “[r]equiring proof of a course of conduct 
beyond the inculpatory statements themselves is critical to ensuring that those statements are 
voluntary admissions and not the dubious product of an overborne will.” Id. at 2272–73 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 59. Id. at 2263 (majority opinion). 
 60. Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 1547 (emphasis added). Weisselberg added, “The 
Court assumed, I believe, that the ‘heavy burden’ to show waiver would create a ‘time out’ prior 
to interrogation, during which well-informed and unpressured suspects could decide whether to 
speak.” Id. at 1529. 
 61. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263 (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 
(1994) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). 
 62. Id. at 2264. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Allen, supra note 17, at 74–75 (referring to “Miranda v. Arizona’s substitution of a 
warning and waiver regime” for the due process “voluntariness” test); Kamisar, supra note 40, 
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Thompkins decision pares down that “familiar regime of warnings and 
waivers”65 by effectively eliminating the “waiver” requirement, which 
changes Miranda’s protections significantly. As Yale Kamisar has 
noted, “‘if the privilege is easily waived, there is really no privilege at 
all.’”66 In Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s words, the Thompkins majority 
“overrules sub silentio an essential aspect of the protections Miranda 
has long provided for the constitutional guarantee against self-
incrimination.”67  
3.  Miranda Is Now About “Fair Notice,” Not Dispelling Coercion 
In both Powell and Thompkins, the Court displayed relative 
indifference to whether the defendants had genuinely escaped or 
overcome the inherent pressures of custodial interrogation. Rather than 
focus on the suspect’s perspective and whether the suspect received 
warnings that fully ensured he comprehended his rights (Powell) and 
was adequately empowered to avoid questioning unless he affirmatively 
chose it (Thompkins), the Court focused on whether the police had 
provided adequate notice to the defendant of his basic rights to have a 
lawyer present and to remain silent.68 Both decisions reflect an ongoing 
reorientation of Miranda of the sort previously described by George 
Thomas: away from the anticoercion concern that clearly motivated the 
Miranda Court and toward a more pared down, due process-like 
“notice” function.69  
Through Thompkins and Powell, the Roberts Court has continued 
this transformation of Miranda, showing that Miranda is no longer 
primarily about dispelling the inherent coercion of the interrogation 
room. Now, Miranda is more akin to due process, simply ensuring that 
“the decision of whether to answer police questions [is] up to 
presumably autonomous agents who have been given information about 
the consequences of answering.”70 
                                                                                                                     
at 172 (explaining that instead of “condition[ing] custodial police questioning on the presence of 
counsel[, Miranda] conditions it . . . on the giving of certain warnings by the police and the 
obtaining of waivers of certain rights from custodial suspects”) (emphasis added); Weisselberg, 
supra note 11, at 1521 (“Miranda’s familiar regime of warnings and waivers was intended to 
afford custodial suspects an informed and unfettered choice between speech and silence and, at 
the same time, prevent involuntary statements.”).  
 65. Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 1521.  
 66. Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal 
Procedure: From Powell to Gideon, from Escobedo to . . . , in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 
33 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965) (quoting Note, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Does 
It Exist in the Police Station?, 5 STAN. L. REV. 459, 477 (1953)). 
 67. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2272 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 68. See supra Section I.A. 
 69. Thomas, supra note 47, at 1083, 1087. 
 70. Id. at 1106. 
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 Thomas argues, “Courts have transformed Miranda from a case 
about the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination to one 
about due process.”71 Miranda’s “long life”—and thus perhaps its 
continued validity—may be rooted in our legal culture’s assumption 
that Americans are “autonomous agents capable of acting in their own 
best interests.”72 This autonomy requires “at least some level of 
information about the consequences of conduct before one acts in a way 
that causes a right to be lost”—that is, it entails being informed of one’s 
rights before choosing what to do in the interrogation room.73 Miranda, 
reformulated as a “fair notice” regime, leaves “the decision of whether 
to answer police questions up to presumably autonomous agents who 
have been given information about the consequences of answering.”74  
Thompkins and Powell add significantly to the evidence 
“suggest[ing] that Miranda is not really about the Fifth Amendment 
privilege”—at least, not anymore.75 Instead, today,  
Miranda is about fair notice that suspects have no duty to 
answer police questions. Once the police give that notice, 
the basic rationale of Miranda is satisfied and everyone is 
happy. The suspect gets the notice he deserves, the police 
get a statement, the prosecutor gets a conviction, and the 
appellate court will affirm (as long as the suspect 
understands the language in which the warnings are 
given).76 
As the Powell Court recognized, Powell is a continuation of the 
Court’s earlier decisions in Prysock and Duckworth.77 Thomas observed 
that Duckworth supported his view “[t]hat Miranda is more about due 
process notice than neutralizing inherent compulsion.”78 As noted 
above, the Court in Duckworth approved warnings that told suspects 
they had a right to a lawyer, but “[w]e have no way of giving you a 
lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you 
go to court.”79 The danger with this warning, Thomas notes, “is that the 
warnings seem to promise an appointed lawyer only if the suspect is 
arraigned at some later time. . . . [I]f the principal function of [Miranda] 
warnings is to dispel the inherent compulsion of police interrogation, 
                                                                                                                     
 71. Id. at 1083. 
 72. Id. at 1106. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 1102. 
 76. Id. 
 77.  Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1204 (2010). 
 78. Thomas, supra note 47, at 1107. 
 79. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 198 (1989) (quoting Eagan v. Duckworth, 843 
F.2d 1554, 1555–56 (7th Cir. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the warnings in Duckworth don’t seem particularly well fitted for the 
job.”80 In contrast, if “the principal idea” of the warnings “is to provide 
notice that a suspect does not have to answer and notice that his answers 
can be used against him in court, [the Duckworth] warnings work just 
fine.”81 
 The same is true of Powell. If the Court were truly concerned with 
neutralizing the inherent compulsion of custodial interrogation, the 
Court should be more concerned with the substance of the warnings. In 
addition, the Court should be keenly interested in empirical research 
suggesting that many suspects misinterpret or do not understand 
Miranda warnings. In Powell, however, the Court ignored that research 
entirely. 
Charles Weisselberg notes that “[a] central assumption of the 
Miranda Court was that suspects would understand the warnings and be 
able to act on them.”82 When Miranda was decided, the “Court had no 
empirical evidence to suggest that standardized warnings would be 
effective.”83 By the time of Powell, however, the Court was presented 
with ample “evidence strongly suggest[ing] the contrary, at least for a 
substantial number of suspects.”84 But the Court no longer seems to care 
about the effectiveness of the warning in dispelling the inherent 
coerciveness of custodial interrogation. Weisselberg notes that the 
Court’s “continued and almost religious belief that any form of warning 
that ‘covers the bases’ will indeed be effective in informing suspects of 
their rights” seems unjustified, given the “remarkable proliferation in 
the variations of warnings,” and the growing empirical evidence that 
many suspects do not fully understand Miranda warnings.85 But perhaps 
the answer is that dispelling coercion is not what the Court wants 
Miranda to do anymore. 
Powell instead suggests the Court is not mainly concerned with 
whether most suspects have fully comprehended and appreciated the 
power of their interrogation rights. The Court is satisfied with the more 
limited goal of ensuring that police have put the defendant on notice of 
his rights—whether or not that notice is really understood and 
appreciated.  
 Thompkins likewise makes much more sense if one assumes the 
Court is interested in ensuring suspects receive “fair notice” of their 
rights, rather than ensuring that suspects are genuinely empowered in 
the custodial interrogation environment. In dissent, Justice Sotomayor 
                                                                                                                     
 80. Thomas, supra note 47, at 1107–08. 
 81. Id. at 1108.  
 82. Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 1577. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
17
Witmer-Rich: Interrogation and the Roberts Court
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
1206 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
accused the majority of “ignor[ing] the important interests Miranda 
safeguards[,]” and stated the majority’s decision “bodes poorly for the 
fundamental principles that Miranda protects.”86 Insofar as the Miranda 
protections were originally intended to dispel the “inherently coercive” 
nature of “custodial interrogation” so as to “ensur[e] [that an accused’s] 
statements are voluntary admissions and not the dubious product of an 
overborne will,”87 Justice Sotomayor’s criticisms are well-grounded. 
Indeed, the majority did little to respond to this critique, perhaps 
because it is true but now misplaced: Miranda is no longer primarily 
about dispelling the inherent coercion of the interrogation room, but 
now serves a due process-like “notice” function, ensuring that “the 
decision of whether to answer police questions [is] up to presumably 
autonomous agents who have been given information about the 
consequences of answering.”88  
The formal logic of the Thompkins majority opinion accepts that 
Miranda is about providing notice and dispelling coercion. As a 
practical matter, however, the majority is now willing to simply assume 
the latter—that any coercion is in fact dispelled—whenever adequate 
notice is provided. Thus, the majority says “[t]he main purpose of 
Miranda is to ensure that an accused is advised of and understands the 
right to remain silent and the right to counsel.”89 Once the warnings 
have been provided, the majority simply assumes any inherent coercion 
is automatically dispelled: “as Miranda holds, full comprehension of the 
rights to remain silent and request an attorney are sufficient to dispel 
whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation process.”90 
The Court’s other conclusion in Thompkins, that “police may 
interrogate a suspect who has neither invoked nor waived his or her 
Miranda rights,”91 also makes more sense based on the “fair notice” 
theory. Weisselberg, writing just before Thompkins was decided, noted 
that when police continue to question a suspect who has not waived his 
Miranda rights, “it would be difficult to continue to assume that 
warnings and waivers take place in an atmosphere where compelling 
pressures are minimized.”92 It is hard to see how permitting police to 
                                                                                                                     
 86. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2273 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 87. Id. at 2272–73. 
 88. Thomas, supra note 47, at 1106. 
 89. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2261. 
 90. Id. at 2260 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Contrast this with the dissent, which takes pains to emphasize that Miranda is 
“premised on the idea that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive,” so “[r]equiring proof 
of a course of conduct beyond the inculpatory statements themselves is critical to ensuring that 
those statements are voluntary admissions and not the dubious product of an overborne will.” Id. 
at 2272–73 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 91. Id. at 2264 (majority opinion). 
 92. Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 1563. 
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interrogate a defendant who remains largely silent for three hours is 
consistent with an overriding concern about the inherent coercion of the 
interrogation room. But if the core purpose of Miranda is “fair notice,” 
then it makes sense that once police have provided notice, they are free 
to question the suspect even without an affirmative waiver. 
In dissent, Justice Sotomayor accused the majority of creating “a 
new general principle of law” that “flatly contradict[s] [the Court’s] 
longstanding views.”93 She stated that “[r]arely do this Court’s 
precedents provide clearly established law so closely on point with the 
facts of a particular case.”94 Under Miranda and Butler, courts “must 
presume that a defendant did not waive his right[s],” that “mere silence” 
in response to questioning is “not enough,”95 and that “waiver may not 
be presumed ‘simply from the fact that a confession was in fact 
eventually obtained.’”96  
The majority, struggling to distinguish Thompkins from those prior 
statements, drew the following fine distinction to explain implied 
waiver. The majority first conceded that “[i]f the State establishes that a 
Miranda warning was given and the accused made an uncoerced 
statement, this showing, standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate ‘a 
valid waiver’ of Miranda rights.”97 Something else is needed. That 
something, the majority explains, is simply the “additional showing that 
the accused understood these rights.”98 Thus, “[w]here the prosecution 
shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by 
the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied 
waiver of the right to remain silent.”99  
The key factor distinguishing an invalid waiver of the sort ruled out 
by Miranda and Butler—warnings and an eventual confession—from a 
valid waiver under Thompkins, is evidence that the warning “was 
understood by the accused.”100 Given the seemingly critical role being 
played by the defendant’s “understanding” of his rights, what sort of 
“understanding” does the Court seem to have in mind? In Powell, the 
Court was singularly unconcerned with evidence of how persons 
actually comprehend and appreciate the full panoply of rights 
recognized by Miranda: so long as the defendant is put on notice of his 
basic rights, Miranda is satisfied. In Thompkins, the evidence that 
Thompkins “understood” his Miranda rights is rather slim. The Court 
                                                                                                                     
 93. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2271 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 94. Id. at 2270. 
 95.  Id. (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 96. Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966)). 
 97. Id. at 2261 (majority opinion) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 2262. 
 100. Id.  
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only wrote in the negative: “There is no basis in this case to conclude 
that he did not understand his rights[,]” and “there is no contention that 
Thompkins did not understand his rights[.]”101 The actual “evidence” 
that Thompkins “understood” his rights is simply the absence of 
evidence that he did not understand them: “Thompkins received a 
written copy of the Miranda warnings; Detective Helgert determined 
that Thompkins could read and understand English; and Thompkins was 
given time to read the warnings. Thompkins, furthermore, read aloud 
the fifth warning . . . .”102 Notwithstanding the Court’s ruling that 
Thompkins’ understanding (or lack thereof) serves as the lynchpin 
distinguishing his waiver from the type of waiver ruled out in Miranda 
and Butler, the Court does not seem overly concerned with the 
robustness of that understanding.  
Again, the majority’s approach in Thompkins—like its relative 
indifference to actual “understanding” in Powell—shows that the Court 
is not really concerned that a suspect achieve a full and genuine 
comprehension of her rights. “Understanding” in both cases simply 
means that the police provided the defendant with “fair notice.”  
Due process rules requiring “fair notice” often place, or imply, some 
level of responsibility on the audience to figure out the notice provided. 
Analogously, George Thomas notes that under due process principles, 
“[t]he prisoner facing loss of good time credits and the parolee facing 
parole revocation can waive the right to a hearing by simply not 
appearing after notice has been given.”103 In those contexts, due process 
is satisfied so long as “the prisoner and the parolee had notice and failed 
to exercise the right about which they were notified.”104 Thus, due 
process “fair notice” rules generally do not inquire whether most or all 
of the intended audience actually received and comprehended the 
notice, but rather whether they had a reasonable opportunity to do so, if 
they took some initiative as responsible citizens to ascertain and 
understand the information being made available. Procedural due 
process is widely understood “at a minimum” to “require that 
deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by 
notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the 
case.”105 
                                                                                                                     
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. 
 103. Thomas, supra note 47, at 1099. 
 104. Id. at 1100. 
 105. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); see also Fuentes 
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (observing that procedural due process is “the right to notice 
and an opportunity to be heard . . . ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner’” (quoting 
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))); Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal 
Due Process, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 2 (2006) (noting the procedural due process 
requirement that “a person may not constitutionally be deprived of ‘life, liberty or property’ by 
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The due process-like “fair notice” feature is evident in Powell and 
Thompkins: both operate with a conception of “understanding” 
concerned primarily with whether police have given the suspects notice 
and a reasonable opportunity to understand and exercise their rights. But 
the Court was not concerned with whether suspects—often of low 
intelligence and relatively uneducated—actually comprehend their 
rights or are affirmatively empowered to assert them. 
B.  Maryland v. Shatzer: Miranda’s Expiration Date and a New 
Prophylactic Antibadgering Rule  
The Roberts Court’s other Fifth Amendment decision, Maryland v. 
Shatzer, placed an “expiration date” on a suspect’s invocation of his 
right to counsel in a custodial interrogation.106 Shatzer was written 
against the backdrop of Miranda and Edwards v. Arizona.107 Under 
Miranda, a suspect in custodial interrogation can invoke either the Fifth 
Amendment right to silence or the Fifth Amendment right to counsel (or 
both).108 In either case, once the suspect has invoked the right to silence 
or counsel, “interrogation must cease.”109 If the suspect invokes the 
right to silence, police must cease the interrogation, but may reapproach 
after some period of time and again ask the defendant to waive his 
rights.110  
The rule is different if the defendant invokes his right to counsel. In 
Edwards, the Court held that “when an accused has invoked his right to 
have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of 
that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to 
further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been 
advised of his rights.”111 When a defendant has invoked his right to 
counsel, he has communicated to police that “he is not capable of 
undergoing . . . questioning without advice of counsel,” and thus a later 
waiver is presumed to be the subject of the inherently compelling 
                                                                                                                     
governmental action without notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.”); Martin H. 
Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due 
Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 475 (1986) (“[T]he Supreme Court has often stated that the core 
rights of due process are notice and hearing . . . .”). 
 106. 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1227 (2010). 
 107. 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
 108. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966). 
 109. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1219 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473–74). 
 110. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 106–07 (1975) (holding that there was no 
Miranda violation when officers “gave full ‘Miranda warnings’ to [the person in custody] at the 
very outset of each interrogation, subjected him to only a brief period of initial questioning, and 
suspended questioning entirely for a significant period before beginning the interrogation that 
led to his incriminating statement”). 
 111. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484. 
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pressures of custodial interrogation.112 As Justice Antonin Scalia 
explained in Shatzer, “[t]he Edwards presumption of involuntariness 
ensures that police will not take advantage of the mounting coercive 
pressures of ‘prolonged police custody,’ by repeatedly attempting to 
question a suspect who previously requested counsel until the suspect is 
‘badgered into submission.’”113 Invocations of the right to counsel 
during custodial interrogation bar future questioning about any offense, 
not just the offense that prompted the initial invocation.114 
In Shatzer, all members of the Court agreed on the fundamental 
problem: without some endpoint, “every Edwards prohibition of 
custodial interrogation of a particular suspect would be eternal[,]” and 
would include interrogations pertaining to “a different crime” and those 
conducted “by a different law enforcement authority.”115 At oral 
argument in Shatzer, Justice Samuel Alito posed what he called “an 
extreme hypothetical”:  
Someone is taken into custody in Maryland in 1999 and 
questioned for joy riding, released from custody, and then 
in 2009 is taken into custody and questioned for murder in 
Montana.  
Now, at the time of the first questioning, the . . . suspect 
invokes the Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Now, does 
the Edwards rule apply to the second interrogation? 116  
Petitioner’s counsel answered “Yes,”117 which prompted Professor 
Susan Bandes to note, “[i]f so, Edwards’ days are numbered.”118 
                                                                                                                     
 112. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 (1988). 
 113. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1220 (citations omitted) (quoting Roberson, 486 U.S. at 686 and 
id. at 690 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), respectively). 
 114. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 677–78. 
 115. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1222; see also id. at 1228 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) 
(“I agree that the presumption from Edwards . . . is not ‘eternal.’” (citations omitted) (quoting 
id. at 1222 (majority opinion))). 
 116. Transcript of Oral Argument at 31–32, Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (No. 08-680) 
[hereinafter Shatzer Transcript], available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/ 
argument_transcripts/08-680.pdf. 
 117. Id. at 32. Justice Alito later posed an even more extreme hypothetical:  
Let me pose you my hypothetical again, the same joy riding questioning, and 
then 40 years later after the person has gotten a law degree and become an 
entrepreneur and made $20 million, he’s taken into custody and questioned by 
the Federal authorities for stock fraud. Forever, you know, this right that was 
invoked back in adolescence continues forever.  
 
Id. at 34. Petitioner’s counsel replied, “It should.” Id. 
 118. Susan A. Bandes, Bright Line Fever: The Argument in Maryland v. Shatzer, ACS 
BLOG (Oct. 6, 2009), http://www.acslaw.org/node/14305.  
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Given the agreement that Edwards invocation should not be 
“eternal,” the Court’s task in Shatzer was to craft a specific rule limiting 
the invocation in some way. The Court did so by adopting a rule that 
Edwards invocations of the right to counsel end fourteen days after the 
suspect’s release from Miranda/Edwards police custody. Thus, a 
defendant like Shatzer who was released from the interrogation room 
back into the general prison population is no longer in “custody” for 
Miranda/Edwards purposes.119 
Rather than create this fourteen-day rule, the Court could have held 
that the prohibition on talking to a suspect who invoked the right to 
counsel ended the instant the suspect was released from custody. The 
“end of custody” rule had been accepted by many lower courts120 and 
was noted as a possibility by Justice Thomas, who concurred in part.121 
Instead, the Court created a new Fifth Amendment “prophylactic” rule: 
once a suspect invoked his right to counsel, police could attempt to 
reinterrogate him only after a fourteen-day break in Miranda custody. 
The Court settled on fourteen days because, according to Justice Scalia, 
“[i]t seems to us” to be the right length of time.122  
This new rule is designed to prevent police from “coerc[ing] or 
badger[ing] [a suspect] into abandoning his earlier refusal to be 
questioned” without the presence of counsel.123 The fourteen-day period 
protects the suspect against police badgering by “provid[ing] plenty of 
time for the suspect to get reacclimated to his normal life, to consult 
with friends and counsel, and to shake off any residual coercive effects 
of his prior custody.”124  
Thus, the Court in Shatzer did not choose the least suspect-friendly 
rule. It was willing to create a new “prophylactic” rule (albeit one with a 
fairly short fuse) to prevent a particular evil: police badgering of a 
suspect who has already invoked his rights. While the Roberts Court’s 
interrogation decisions show little concern for protecting suspects from 
                                                                                                                     
 119. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1223–24. 
 120. Id. at 1220 (“Lower courts have uniformly held that a break in custody ends the 
Edwards presumption . . . .” (citing People v. Storm, 52 P.3d 52, 61–62 n.6 (Cal. 2002))).   
 121. Id. at 1227–28 (Thomas, J., concurring in part). Notably, Justice Thomas did not 
actually express the view that the Edwards presumption should even last until the end of 
Miranda custody. Justice Thomas, showing his continued willingness to overrule precedent, 
stated, “It is not apparent to me that the presumption of involuntariness the Court recognized in 
Edwards is justifiable even in the custodial setting to which Edwards applies it.” Id. at 1227 
(citing Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 160 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Justice 
Thomas thus explained that he would not extend Edwards beyond its facts: “But even if one 
believes that the Court is obliged to apply Edwards to any case involving continuing custody, 
the Court’s opinion today goes well beyond that.” Id.  
 122. Id. at 1223–24 (majority opinion). 
 123. Id. at 1220. 
 124. Id. at 1223. 
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the inherent compulsion of custodial interrogation, the Court does seem 
to retain one concern: excessive badgering by police of a suspect who 
has already told them she does not want to talk, or needs a lawyer.125  
The Shatzer Court’s concern about preventing police from badgering 
a suspect who has already invoked his rights appears again in its Sixth 
Amendment Montejo v. Louisiana decision, discussed below. This 
suggests that part of the Court’s vision for “fair play” in interrogations 
is respecting the voluntary choices of autonomous agents. The Court is 
chipping away at or eliminating rules designed to protect what the 
Warren Court viewed as the inherent vulnerabilities shared by most 
interrogation suspects. But in Shatzer the Court went so far as to create 
a new prophylactic rule to protect the assertion of rights by an 
autonomous suspect. This same concern will be seen reflected in 
Montejo below.  
II.  RESHAPING RULES FOR SIXTH AMENDMENT INTERROGATION: “FAIR 
PLAY” FOR BOTH DEFENDANTS AND PROSECUTORS 
The Roberts Court issued two Sixth Amendment interrogation 
decisions, Kansas v. Ventris and Montejo v. Louisiana, both written by 
Justice Scalia. Montejo received more attention, as it overruled the 
twenty-three-year-old precedent of Michigan v. Jackson.126 In doing so, 
the Court cleared away a large portion of Sixth Amendment 
interrogation law, giving the Roberts Court the opportunity and 
doctrinal space to create new rules on a relatively clean slate. Ventris is 
also quite important, however, not only for its holding—that statements 
taken in violation of Massiah, outside the presence of counsel, can be 
used to impeach a testifying defendant—but for what its reasoning 
reveals about the long-opaque nature of the values underlying Sixth 
Amendment interrogation limits. Together, the two decisions, like the 
Roberts Court’s Fifth Amendment interrogation cases, show a Court 
crafting rules to ensure “fair play” in interrogations, rather than to 
protect vulnerable defendants. 
A.  Kansas v. Ventris: “Fair Play,” Impeaching a Defendant’s 
Testimony, and Statements Obtained in Violation of the Sixth 
Amendment 
Kansas v. Ventris was the first decision under Chief Justice Roberts’ 
tenure relating to Sixth Amendment rights during police interrogation. 
In Ventris, Justice Scalia, writing for a seven-member majority, held 
that a defendant’s incriminating statements, even if obtained in violation 
of the Sixth Amendment “strictures” imposed in Massiah v. United 
                                                                                                                     
 125. Id. at 1220–21. 
 126.  Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2091 (2009). 
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States, were admissible for the purpose of impeaching the defendant’s 
later testimony at trial.127 Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice 
Ginsburg, dissented.128 
The Court’s holding and reasoning together reveal several notable 
features about the Roberts Court’s view of the underlying nature of the 
Sixth Amendment. First, Justice Stevens, in dissent, accused the Court 
of reducing Massiah to a “prophylactic” rule.129 On the contrary: 
Ventris actually affirms that Massiah is not a “prophylactic” rule 
designed to protect some other Sixth Amendment right, but rather is 
itself a part of the Sixth Amendment. Among other things, this means 
that police violate the Sixth Amendment—and are potentially liable in a 
§ 1983130 civil action for deprivation of rights—by intentionally 
interrogating a represented, charged defendant about the charged 
offense. It also means, as Justice Scalia explained, that exclusion of 
statements for all potential trial purposes does not flow automatically 
from a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.131  
Second, the opinion suggests Massiah is based on a conception of 
“fair play” in the criminal process. This is evident in the two key parts 
of Ventris: first, that interrogators violate the Sixth Amendment the 
moment they interrogate an uncounseled (but charged) defendant 
without a waiver because to do so unfairly exploits the unequal powers 
of the two parties; and second, that even when a statement is excluded 
from the government’s case-in-chief, it would be unfair to allow the 
defendant to take the stand and testify inconsistently with that prior 
statement.132 In Ventris, then, “fair play” cuts both ways. 
Explaining these points requires a brief description of the legal 
landscape leading up to Ventris. Before Ventris, the Court had 
consistently held that statements taken in violation of various Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment “prophylactic” protections could be used to impeach 
a testifying defendant. In Harris v. New York,133 the Court held that 
statements taken in violation of Miranda—specifically when “no 
warning of a right to appointed counsel was given before questions were 
put to petitioner when he was taken into custody”—were admissible to 
impeach the defendant’s trial testimony, even though inadmissible in 
the prosecution’s case-in-chief.134 The Court reasoned that it would not 
allow “[t]he shield provided by Miranda [to] be perverted into a license 
                                                                                                                     
 127.  Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1844–45, 1847 (2009). 
 128.  Id. at 1847. 
 129. Id. at 1848 (Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). 
 130.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 131.  Ventris, 129 S. Ct. at 1847. 
 132.  Id. at 1846. 
 133. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
 134. Id. at 224. 
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to use perjury by way of a defense.”135 Moreover, the Court reasoned 
that if the purpose of the exclusionary rule was to have “a deterrent 
effect on proscribed police conduct, sufficient deterrence flows when 
the evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its 
case in chief.”136 Any further deterrence to be gained by also excluding 
confessions from use in impeachment, the Court reasoned, was 
“speculative.”137  
Later, in Oregon v. Hass,138 the Court applied the same rule, 
permitting the prosecution to impeach the defendant with statements he 
gave after invoking his Fifth Amendment right to counsel—a different 
Miranda violation than the failure to give warnings in Harris.139 In 
Hass, the Court acknowledged the risk created by this rule: “One might 
concede that when proper Miranda warnings have been given, and the 
officer then continues his interrogation after the suspect asks for an 
attorney, the officer may be said to have little to lose and perhaps 
something to gain by way of possibly uncovering impeachment 
material.”140 The Court dismissed this as a “speculative possibility” that 
did not change its conclusion.141  
The Court reached the same result in the Sixth Amendment context 
in Michigan v. Harvey,142 allowing the prosecution to impeach a 
testifying defendant with statements obtained in violation of Michigan 
v. Jackson’s rule that “after a defendant requests assistance of counsel, 
any waiver of Sixth Amendment rights given in a discussion initiated by 
police is presumed invalid.”143 Citing Harris and Hass,144 the Court 
explained that voluntary statements may be used in impeachment even 
when they are inadmissible in the government’s case-in-chief “when the 
violations alleged by a defendant relate only to procedural safeguards 
that are ‘not themselves rights protected by the Constitution,’ (Miranda 
rules), but are instead measures designed to ensure that constitutional 
rights are protected.”145 
In Ventris, the Sixth Amendment violation was not a violation of 
Michigan v. Jackson’s “prophylactic” rule, as in Harvey. Instead, the 
statements used to impeach Ventris, the testifying defendant, were 
                                                                                                                     
 135. Id. at 226. 
 136. Id. at 225. 
 137. Id. 
 138. 420 U.S. 714 (1975). 
 139.  Id. at 722–24. 
 140. Id. at 723. 
 141. Id. 
 142.  494 U.S. 344 (1990). 
 143. Id. at 349–50. 
 144.  Id. at 350–51 (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) and Haas, 420 U.S. 
714 (1975)). 
 145. Id. at 351 (citation omitted) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)). 
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obtained by a jailhouse informant planted by police in Ventris’ pretrial 
holding cell. Ventris was charged with felony murder and aggravated 
theft, among other counts, in the robbery and shooting death of Ernest 
Hicks. At trial, Ventris took the stand in his own defense and blamed 
the robbery and shooting on his codefendant Rhonda Theel, who 
pleaded guilty and testified against Ventris at trial.146 The State 
impeached Ventris with testimony from the jailhouse informant, who 
testified that Ventris had confessed to him that “[h]e’d shot this man in 
his head and in his chest and taken his keys, his wallet, about $350.00, 
and . . . a vehicle.”147 Notably, the jury apparently did not fully credit 
this informant’s testimony, as it acquitted Ventris of felony murder. The 
jury did, however, convict Ventris on aggravated burglary and 
aggravated robbery charges.148 
The Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that the jailhouse 
informant had deliberately elicited this confession from Ventris, thereby 
violating the rule in Massiah against deliberately eliciting statements 
from a represented, charged defendant without a valid waiver of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.149 Determining “[w]hether 
otherwise excluded evidence can be admitted for purposes of 
impeachment[,]” Justice Scalia explained, “depends upon the nature of 
the constitutional guarantee that is violated.”150 In light of Harris, Hass, 
and Harvey, the obvious route to permitting impeachment use would be 
to declare Massiah a “prophylactic” rule—like Miranda and Michigan 
v. Jackson—and apply the Harris-Hass-Harvey rule that “statements 
taken in violation of only the prophylactic Miranda [or Jackson] 
rules . . . are admissible to impeach conflicting testimony by the 
defendant.”151 Professor Carol S. Steiker has observed that these prior 
decisions had left: 
open the door to concluding that Massiah’s ban on 
questioning in the absence of counsel after the 
commencement of adversary proceedings, like Miranda’s 
ban on the questioning of suspects in custody in the 
absence of warnings, is not an interpretation of the 
Constitution, but rather a prophylactic rule designed to 
sweep more broadly than the actual constitutional right in 
order to deter police misconduct.152  
                                                                                                                     
 146. Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1844 (2009). 
 147. Id. (quoting Joint Appendix at 154, 150, Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841 (No. 07-1356), 2008 
WL 4905476 at *154, *150) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. at 1845 (citing Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964)). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990). 
 152. Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two 
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If so, Steiker predicted, “the consequences for the Massiah rule likely 
would be very similar to the consequences that have obtained already in 
the Miranda context.”153 Among other things, “statements taken in 
violation of Massiah likely would be permitted as impeachment against 
a defendant who testified contrary to such statements at trial.”154 
Recasting Massiah as a “prophylactic” rule, Steiker argues, would 
constitute a “re-working of Massiah” similar to the Court’s past 
constriction of Fourth and Fifth Amendment rules.155  
Does Ventris accomplish, in the Sixth Amendment context, the 
“counter-revolution in constitutional criminal procedure” that Steiker 
had observed in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments but not yet in the 
Sixth Amendment? Justice Stevens seems to think so. Dissenting in 
Ventris, Justice Stevens claimed that the majority’s holding “relies on 
the view that a defendant’s pretrial right to counsel is merely 
‘prophylactic’ in nature,” and that “any violation of this prophylactic 
right occurs solely at the time the State subjects a counseled defendant 
to an uncounseled interrogation, not when the fruits of the encounter are 
used against the defendant at trial.”156 Justice Stevens objected to 
reducing the pretrial right to counsel to a “prophylactic” right, arguing 
that “[p]lacing the prophylactic label on a core Sixth Amendment right 
mischaracterizes the sweep of the constitutional guarantee.”157  
1.  Massiah Is Not a Prophylactic Rule, and Massiah Violations Occur 
at the Time of Uncounseled Interrogation 
Before Ventris, commentators had long made two assertions about 
Massiah: (1) it is part of the Sixth Amendment itself, not a 
“prophylactic” rule;158 and (2) like the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination, Massiah is violated when the statement is 
introduced at trial, not at the time of interrogation.159 The Court in 
                                                                                                                     
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2527 (1996). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1848 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure, supra note 17, at 122–
23 (asserting that it is “erroneous” to describe the Massiah rule “as prophylactic”); Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 889 (1981) (“[T]he Massiah 
‘exclusionary rule’ is not merely a prophylactic device[.]”); James J. Tomkovicz, Saving 
Massiah from Elstad: The Admissibility of Successive Confessions Following a Deprivation of 
Counsel, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 711, 754–55 (2007) (“[I]t is difficult to imagine how the 
Massiah doctrine might be recast as mere prophylactic guidelines that guard against presumed, 
but not actual, right to counsel violations.”). But see Steiker, supra note 152, at 2527 (claiming 
the Court has left the question “open”).  
159. See Schulhofer, supra note 158, at 889 (“Massiah . . . is not intended to deter any 
pretrial behavior whatsoever. Rather, Massiah explicitly permits government efforts to obtain 
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Ventris confirmed the first point and rejected the second.160 
As noted above, one easy route for the Court to permit impeachment 
use of Massiah violations would be to declare Massiah a “prophylactic 
rule”—something prior decisions had left “open.”161 The Court’s line of 
cases in Harris v. New York,162 Oregon v. Hass,163 and Michigan v. 
Harvey164—all permitting impeachment use by declaring the violated 
right merely “prophylactic”—paved the way for that approach. But 
contrary to Justice Stevens’ claim, the Ventris majority did not follow 
that route.  
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, first explained that 
“[w]hether otherwise excluded evidence can be admitted for purposes of 
impeachment depends upon the nature of the constitutional guarantee 
that is violated. Sometimes that explicitly mandates exclusion from trial, 
and sometimes it does not.”165 To illustrate, he first mentioned the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination. Given the nature of that 
right—protection from being “compelled to give [testimony] against” 
oneself—the right “is violated whenever a truly coerced confession is 
introduced at trial[.]”166 
 Justice Scalia contrasted this with Fourth Amendment violations and 
violations of “Fifth and Sixth Amendment prophylactic rules forbidding 
certain pretrial . . . conduct.”167 The Fourth Amendment, for example, is 
not a trial right against the use of certain evidence, but rather is a right 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus, the exclusion of 
evidence obtained from a Fourth Amendment violation is not automatic, 
but rather is a remedy imposed by the Court based on a cost-benefit 
analysis. Justice Scalia asserted that “[t]he same is true” for violations 
of Fifth and Sixth Amendment “prophylactic” rules.168  
 How does a Massiah violation fit into this scheme? Rather than call 
                                                                                                                     
information from an indicted suspect, so long as that information is not used ‘as evidence 
against him at his trial.’ . . . [I]t is the admission at trial that in itself denies the constitutional 
right.”); James J. Tomkovicz, The Massiah Right to Exclusion: Constitutional Premises and 
Doctrinal Implications, 67 N.C. L. REV. 751, 763 (1989) (“[A] sixth amendment violation 
occur[s] at the time of, and only at the time of, admission at trial of the fruits of an uncounseled 
pretrial encounter.”). 
 160.  Ventris, 129 S. Ct. at 1845–47. 
 161. Steiker, supra note 152, at 2527. 
 162. 401 U.S. 222, 223–26 (1971) (statements in absence of Miranda warnings could be 
used to impeach). 
 163. 420 U.S. 714, 723–24 (1975) (statements after suspect invoked Miranda rights could 
be used to impeach). 
 164. 494 U.S. 344, 345–46 (1990) (statements in violation of Michigan v. Jackson could be 
used to impeach). 
 165. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. at 1845.  
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
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Massiah a “prophylactic” rule, Justice Scalia explained the nature of a 
Massiah violation: specifically, when police violate a defendant’s right 
to counsel during a pretrial interrogation, the violation occurs at the 
time of the interrogation, not upon the later admission of that evidence 
at trial.169 Because the violation is complete at the time of the 
interrogation, the question of admissibility at trial—as in the Fourth 
Amendment context—“does not involve, therefore, the prevention of a 
constitutional violation, but rather the scope of the remedy for a 
violation that has already occurred.”170 Whether to permit impeachment 
use of a statement obtained in violation of Massiah thus depends—like 
a Fourth Amendment violation—on whether the relative costs (to the 
truth-seeking process) and benefits (deterring the earlier violation) 
mandate exclusion. On that point, the Court’s “precedents make clear 
that the game of excluding tainted evidence for impeachment purposes 
is not worth the candle.”171 
 Thus, implicit in the Court’s reasoning is the conclusion that 
Massiah violations are actual Sixth Amendment violations, not merely 
violations of a “prophylactic” rule. The majority also says so fairly 
explicitly: “We hold that the informant’s testimony, concededly elicited 
in violation of the Sixth Amendment, was admissible to challenge 
Ventris’s inconsistent testimony at trial.”172  
2.  “Fair Play” in Interrogation and Prosecution 
Beyond clarifying the nature of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, Ventris suggests that the right is based on underlying values of 
“fair play” in criminal prosecution. Uncounseled pretrial interrogation 
(after charging) is prohibited because it violates “fair play”—“the basic 
dictates of fairness in the conduct of criminal causes.”173 And “fair 
play” is also the reason prosecutors are permitted to impeach defendants 
with prior inconsistent statements, even when obtained illegally: it 
would be unfair to allow a defendant to testify at his trial inconsistently 
with prior statements, immune from impeachment.  
In Massiah itself, and in later decisions, the Supreme Court never 
provided a fully convincing explanation for why police are prohibited 
from eliciting statements from a represented defendant without counsel 
(or waiver of the right to counsel).174 It is clear that Massiah’s 
                                                                                                                     
 169. Id. at 1846. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 1847 (emphasis added). 
 173. Id. at 1846 (quoting Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 174. Tomkovicz, supra note 159, at 762 (“The rationale for sixth amendment suppression 
is not at all clear. The Court has failed to rationalize Massiah-based exclusion with clarity or 
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protections are not based primarily on the concerns originally 
motivating the Miranda decision: protecting defendants from the 
inherent compulsion of the interrogation room. Massiah is not triggered 
by “custodial interrogation,” as Miranda is. Moreover, Massiah 
prohibits the police from deliberately eliciting statements even when the 
defendant does not know he is speaking to a government agent and thus 
presumably can feel no compulsion from the state to speak.175 
Commentators have long debated what core theory, if any, best 
explains Massiah. Professor H. Richard Uviller has posited three 
different conceptions of the lawyer’s role that might underlie the 
decision: (1) “preparatory assistance,” (2) “preventive assistance,” and 
(3) “adversarial assistance.”176 Ventris, I argue, shows the Court 
endorsing the “preventive assistance” model (or what I would call “fair 
play”).  
Uviller explains that the fundamental idea of the first model, 
“preparatory assistance,” is to “prevent[] . . . the ultimate injustice[,]” 
namely “the erroneous conviction of an innocent person[,]” by 
providing “help for an accused person in need.”177 Because the purpose 
of this help is to prevent conviction of the innocent, the courts should 
require “counsel’s special talent and concern” at any “vital juncture” 
when counsel’s presence is required to “enhance the reliability of the 
verdict”—for example, “counsel might assist in preserving evanescent 
exculpatory evidence or by employing the mechanisms of adjudication 
to obtain a valid outcome.”178 Thus, the “preparatory assistance” model 
might be referred to as a “just outcome” model. 
Uviller’s second model is that of counsel providing “preventive 
assistance” or ensuring “fair play.” This model assumes a criminal 
defendant faces an “uneven match” at the hands of the “immense forces 
of the state arrayed against him.”179 As Uviller explains:  
 
[Z]ealous counsel is the best instrument to ameliorate the 
                                                                                                                     
consistency, proffering deficient and potentially contradictory explanations.” (footnote 
omitted)); H. Richard Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A 
Reconsideration of the Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 
1164 (1987) (“We are not much aided in discovering the answers by the Court’s own 
explanation in the principal cases. The majority simply informs us that the reason Massiah’s and 
Williams’ statements are unusable is because, though accused, the defendants were denied the 
assistance of counsel and did not operatively waive their entitlement. While it is undeniable that 
a lawyer might have ‘assisted’ them in the sense of reducing the culpable evidence available to 
the prosecution, the Court does not justify this construction of ‘assistance’ nor explain why the 
right to such assistance should depend entirely on the formalistic moment of ‘accusation.’”). 
 175.  Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206–07. 
 176. Uviller, supra note 174, at 1169–83. 
 177. Id. at 1169. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 1173. 
31
Witmer-Rich: Interrogation and the Roberts Court
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
1220 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
inherent disadvantage of the defendant’s position and give him 
a fair, fighting chance. . . . The theory of “preventive 
assistance” is wholly different from the “preparatory 
assistance” argument in that while the latter is designed to 
promote a just result; this one is dedicated to the idea of a fair 
fight.180  
 
Other commentators have articulated theories similar to Uviller’s 
“preventive assistance” model. Professors Silas Wasserstrom and 
William J. Mertens claim that “Massiah . . . seems directly concerned 
with the balance of litigative advantages between the prosecution and 
the defense at trial[]” by “assur[ing] that prosecutors will not secure any 
trial advantages from the defendant by going outside established, and 
judicially regulated, channels and that the defense counsel will 
participate in equal terms with the prosecutor.”181  
Professor James Tomkovicz’s theory of the Sixth Amendment is also 
similar to Uviller’s “preventive assistance” or “fair play” model. 
Tomkovicz states, “The grant of counsel to the inherently inferior 
defendant is designed to promote balanced contests by equalizing the 
adversaries,” given that the prosecution in our system’s “contest 
between opposing sides . . . is significantly more powerful in most, if 
not all, relevant respects.”182 Counsel is thus guaranteed to promote 
“‘[r]ough equality’ between the opponents,” to ensure “not only . . . 
accurate and truthful results, but also . . . that those results are the 
products of adversarial fair play.”183 In a later article, Tomkovicz 
explains that “the Sixth Amendment’s sole original objective . . . is . . . 
to equalize an accused and protect against the increased risks of 
conviction that result when a defendant must deal with the legal system 
or an expert adversary without a lawyer’s guidance.”184 All of these 
commentators are discussing a similar notion: equalizing the process 
(making it fair) by inserting counsel for the defendant.  
Uviller’s third model, “adversarial assistance,” is based on the 
premise that in an adversarial system, “ex parte access is anathema.”185 
In an adversarial system, as opposed to an inquisitorial one, “the state 
may not cross into the accused’s territory to sample the contents of the 
defendant’s mind without the concurrence of the guardian of the 
fortress, his legal adviser.”186 Tomkovicz also sometimes articulates 
                                                                                                                     
 180. Id. 
 181. Silas Wasserstrom & William J. Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But 
Was it a Fair Trial?, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 175–76 (1984). 
 182. Tomkovicz, supra note 159, at 753. 
 183. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 184. Tomkovicz, supra note 158, at 753. 
 185. Uviller, supra note 174, at 1176. 
 186. Id. Uviller ultimately concludes that none of his three possible theories adequately 
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similar purposes. He notes that Massiah protects “[c]ounsel’s advice not 
to cooperate with the state by divulging inculpatory information” to the 
prosecution, a rule which “guarantees that the government will shoulder 
the entire burden of proving guilt without assistance from its 
adversary.”187 Tomkovicz explains elsewhere that “[i]n the pretrial 
setting defined by Massiah’s doctrine, legal assistance helps prevent an 
accused from providing the adversary with ammunition that can seal his 
fate.”188 These statements resonate with Uviller’s “adversarial 
assistance” model, which is concerned with preserving the adversarial 
system. For Tomkovicz, however, the core justification for preserving 
the “adversarial system” seems to be ensuring “fair play”; he notes that 
Massiah assures that “the accused will not be convicted on the basis of 
advantages the government has secured by denying adversarial 
equalization.”189 Thus for Tomkovicz, the “adversarial” values are 
fundamentally about “equalization” of the contest between the parties—
that is, about fairness. 
Ultimately, it seems that the “adversarial assistance” model must 
collapse into one of the other two models (as it appears to do for 
Tomkovicz). Recognizing that ours is an adversarial system of justice 
does little to provide an ultimate explanation for whether and when 
counsel must be provided. An adversarial system is not an end in 
itself—it is valuable (if at all) because it serves some other goal. Thus, it 
might be argued that an adversarial system is the best process for 
discerning truth—that is, a just outcome.190 Alternately, it might be 
argued that we value an adversarial system because that process is most 
fair, in the sense of providing an equal contest (“fair play”) between the 
two interested parties—the government and the accused.191 Or one 
                                                                                                                     
justify the Massiah rule, which he states is most likely based on (inappropriate) “judicial 
discomfort with the anomalous inquisitorial component in the adversary design.” Id. at 1183. 
For present purposes, however, these three models provide a useful way to analyze the Court’s 
definition of the Sixth Amendment right in Ventris. 
 187. Tomkovicz, supra note 159, at 766–67. 
 188. Tomkovicz, supra note 158, at 754. 
 189. Id. (emphasis added). 
 190. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 360 (1977) (referring to the Court’s “belief that 
debate between adversaries is often essential to the truth-seeking function of trials”); Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (noting that effective representation by counsel “is 
critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results”). 
 191. See, e.g., McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 188–89 (1991) (Stevens, J., joined by 
Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (“Undergirding our entire line of cases requiring the 
police to follow fair procedures when they interrogate presumptively innocent citizens 
suspected of criminal wrongdoing is the longstanding recognition that an adversarial system of 
justice can function effectively only when the adversaries communicate with one another 
through counsel and when laypersons are protected from overreaching by more experienced and 
skilled professionals. Whenever the Court ignores the importance of fair procedure in this 
context and describes the societal interest in obtaining ‘uncoerced confessions’ from pretrial 
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might argue that an adversarial model serves both the values of truth 
and fairness.192 In any event, the “adversarial system” model seems to 
have little value independent of the underlying value or values that 
system is presumed to promote. Indeed, as noted below, the Court in 
Ventris disregards the “adversarial assistance” model as an independent 
reason for providing counsel during interrogations. 
Thus, the three justifications commentators have articulated as 
possibly underlying Sixth Amendment interrogation rules are (1) “just 
outcome” (or “preparatory assistance”), (2) “fair play” (or “preventive 
assistance”), and (3) “adversarial system” (or “adversarial assistance”). 
As I will explain, the Ventris opinion rejected the “just outcome” model, 
disregarded the “adversarial system” model, and offered at least 
tentative endorsement of the “fair play” model. 
In Ventris, Justice Scalia made several comments on the nature of 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in general and the Massiah right 
in particular. First, he stated that “[t]he core of the [Sixth Amendment] 
right to counsel is indeed a trial right, ensuring that the prosecution’s 
case is subjected to ‘the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.’”193 
As for the Massiah rule, the Court has “held that the right covers 
pretrial interrogations to ensure that police manipulation does not render 
counsel entirely impotent—depriving the defendant of ‘effective 
representation by counsel at the only stage when legal aid and advice 
would help him.’”194  
Justice Scalia’s concern here for “police manipulation” could be 
understood in at least two ways. Perhaps he means police pressure of 
the sort that might lead an innocent person to make inculpatory 
statements. If that is what “police manipulation” means, Justice Scalia’s 
concern looks like the “preparatory assistance”/“just outcome” model, 
in which counsel’s core function is to prevent conviction of the 
innocent. On the other hand, “police manipulation” might also simply 
mean police obtaining an unfair advantage by getting an unwary 
defendant to implicate himself when a more savvy, empowered 
defendant would know to keep silent and not provide the advantage to 
his opponent. This understanding would suggest a “preventive 
assistance”/“fair play” model, meaning the preservation of a fair playing 
field—preventing police from winning the “game” before it really even 
starts. Justice Scalia did not clearly explain which of these concerns (or 
                                                                                                                     
detainees as an ‘unmitigated good,’ the Court is revealing a preference for an inquisitorial 
system of justice.” (emphasis added)). 
 192. See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (“The system assumes that 
adversarial testing will ultimately advance the public interest in truth and fairness.”). 
 193. Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1845 (2009) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 
U.S. 648, 656 (1984)). 
 194. Id. (quoting Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964)). 
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perhaps both) he was describing. 
Justice Scalia then considered the nature of the constitutional 
violation in a Massiah case. According to Justice Scalia, Massiah 
suggested (on the one hand) that “the violation occurred at the moment 
of the postindictment interrogation because such questioning 
‘contravenes the basic dictates of fairness in the conduct of criminal 
causes’”195—a “fair play” model. On the other hand, Massiah also 
suggested the violation only occurs when the statement is improperly 
“used against the defendant at . . . trial”—a “just outcome” model.196 
Faced with these two competing visions of the right, the Ventris Court 
chose the former and rejected the latter: “Now that we are confronted 
with the question, we conclude that the Massiah right is a right to be 
free of uncounseled interrogation, and is infringed at the time of the 
interrogation.”197  
Having decided that “the violation occur[s] at the moment of the 
postindictment interrogation,” the Court appeared to be endorsing the 
theory that Massiah is premised on the “basic dictates of fairness in the 
conduct of criminal causes”198—a “fair play” rationale for Massiah and 
the pretrial Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Unfortunately, the Court 
did not explain its choice very well. Instead of telling the reader why the 
Court chose the former option, Justice Scalia explained why the Court 
rejected the latter. Justice Scalia stated that it is “illogical” to say the 
violation occurs when the evidence is admitted because the right to 
counsel is “not denied . . . merely because the prosecution has been 
permitted to introduce evidence of guilt—even evidence so 
overwhelming that the attorney’s job of gaining an acquittal is rendered 
impossible.”199 Thus, even in a case in which (putting any Massiah 
violation aside) the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, the defendant 
still has the right to the assistance of counsel. Counsel must be present 
and able to fight on the defendant’s behalf, even when that fight is 
obviously doomed from the start. The right might be analogized to the 
right to have a coach for your baseball team, even when your Little 
League team is facing the Yankees: you still have a right to a coach, 
even though you will obviously lose against the overpowering and 
overmatched force against you.200 
 Justice Scalia went on to explain that past cases have implicitly 
recognized that “the assistance of counsel has been denied” at the point 
                                                                                                                     
 195. Id. at 1846 (quoting Massiah, 377 U.S. at 205). 
 196. Id. (quoting Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206–07) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. (quoting Massiah, 377 U.S. at 205) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 199. Id. at 1846. 
 200. As Uviller has noted, “it is surprisingly difficult to escape the sporting analogy” in 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel discussions. Uviller, supra note 174, at 1174. 
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police interrogate a charged suspect without adequate warnings and 
waivers.201 In Patterson v. Illinois,202 the Court held “that the stringency 
of the warnings necessary for a waiver of the assistance of counsel 
varies according to ‘the usefulness of counsel to the accused at the 
particular [pretrial] proceeding.’”203 That is to say, counsel is required 
under the Sixth Amendment at interrogations because of “the usefulness 
of counsel” at that particular stage. Invoking the “usefulness of counsel” 
at interrogations again seems to reflect a “fair play” model of Sixth 
Amendment rights. A lawyer is “useful” at an interrogation by 
protecting the defendant from a potentially overwhelming adversary and 
keeping a defendant from “giving away the farm” at this early stage 
(and without the reciprocal benefit of a good plea deal). A lawyer is 
“useful” in keeping the playing field fairer.  
Insofar as Justice Scalia’s opinion chose the “fair play” theory of 
Massiah over the “just outcome” theory, the Court’s description of the 
remedy shows that the Court’s vision of “fair play” is markedly 
different from that articulated by commentators. Tomkovicz argues that 
if Massiah is rooted in a theory of “fair play,” then “Massiah exclusion 
is akin to the suppression of statements under the Due Process and Self-
Incrimination Clauses. Like those two guarantees, the Sixth 
Amendment safeguards an interest in not being convicted as a result of 
government methods deemed unfair by our Constitution.”204 
Accordingly, a statement taken in violation of Massiah should not be 
usable by the prosecution for any purpose, including impeachment.205 
But the Court in Ventris decided that exclusion is not always 
required as a remedy for a Massiah violation. The reason prosecutors 
can impeach a testifying defendant with inconsistent pretrial statements, 
even ones unfairly obtained by the police in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment, is that it would be unfair to allow the defendant to 
“provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths.”206  
Professor Donald Dripps has called this the “waiver theory” of the 
Court’s past impeachment cases.207 Dripps suggests that by “taking the 
stand and testifying contrary to the prior statement, [the defendant has] 
waived his privilege against the use of the previously compelled 
admission. . . . Thus the defendant who testifies accepts the obligation 
                                                                                                                     
 201. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. at 1846. 
 202. 487 U.S. 285 (1988). 
 203. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. at 1846 (quoting Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298 (1988)). 
 204. Tomkovicz, supra note 158, at 755.  
 205. Id.   
 206. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. at 1846 (quoting Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 207. Donald Dripps, Is the Miranda Caselaw Really Inconsistent? A Proposed Fifth 
Amendment Synthesis, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 19, 29–30 (2000). 
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to answer truthfully the prosecutor’s questions on cross.”208 The 
defendant has “the alternative of not testifying, reinforced by an 
instruction to the jury to draw no inference of guilt from standing 
silent.”209 When a defendant has given a previous statement to the 
police under unconstitutional circumstances or pressures, the 
government cannot build its case on that statement—that would not be 
fair. But it would also be unfair, the theory goes, for the defendant to 
affirmatively choose to take the stand and testify inconsistently with 
that prior statement. 
Dripps argues that “[t]he best interpretation recognizes that coercive 
questioning with the object of ultimate incrimination violates the 
privilege, and that use of the evidence constitutes a separate and distinct 
violation.”210 When the defendant chooses to take the stand and testify, 
fairness dictates that the defendant has waived his objection to the 
second violation—at least has waived the right to object if he testified 
inconsistently with that prior statement.211 In that case, “[t]he pretrial 
violation needs to be deterred, but the scope of the deterrent remedy is 
fairly subject to policy-based qualifications just as is the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule. The constitutional concern is what 
happened in the interrogation room, not what happened at the trial.”212 
Dripps offered his theory as an explanation of New York v. Harris, 
but it also seems to fit the Court’s approach in Ventris. The Ventris 
Court relied squarely on Walder, Harris, and Hass, each of which can 
be read as articulating a “fairness” concern: that permitting a defendant 
to testify free from cross-examination with a prior inconsistent 
statement is not “fair play.” The Ventris Court quoted Walder in stating, 
“It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an affirmative 
use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to say that the 
defendant can . . . provide himself with a shield against contradiction of 
his untruths.”213 
This is not an argument about the deterrence of constitutional 
violations; it is an argument about fairness. Even though the 
government cannot build its case on evidence illegally obtained, it 
would be unfair to allow a defendant to mislead the jury in the face of 
probative, reliable (but illegally obtained) evidence to the contrary. In 
Harris, the Court similarly stated:  
                                                                                                                     
 208. Id. at 30. 
 209. Id.  
 210. Id. at 31–32.  
 211. Id. at 32.  
 212. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 167 (Mass. 2005) (“[T]he 
equitable principle, at the heart of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, [is] that a party may 
not gain advantage from his own wrong.”). 
 213. Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1846 (2009) (quoting Walder v. United States, 347 
U.S. 62, 65 (1954)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own 
defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot be 
construed to include the right to commit perjury. . . . 
Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an 
obligation to speak truthfully and accurately. . . . The shield 
provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to 
use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of 
confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.214  
This reasoning is not about the “prophylactic” nature of the Fifth 
Amendment right in Harris, but it instead concerns the fairness of 
permitting a defendant to testify inconsistently with a prior statement. 
In Ventris, then, the Court permitted impeachment use of statements 
obtained in violation of Massiah not because Massiah is a 
“prophylactic” rule, but instead because the Court reasoned that it 
would be unfair to permit a defendant to affirmatively testify 
inconsistently with a prior statement while shielded by the Massiah 
rule—itself grounded on concerns for “fair play.” The Court in Ventris 
used the terminology of both fairness and deterrence. The argument that 
the defendant should not be allowed to “provide himself with a shield 
against contradiction of his untruths”215 is a fairness argument. The 
unfairness of the defendant’s inconsistency waives, or outweighs, his 
objection to the use of illegally obtained evidence. The remaining 
question is whether the evidence should nevertheless be excluded to 
deter the earlier constitutional violation, and on that score Justice Scalia 
confidently asserted that “the game of excluding tainted evidence for 
impeachment purposes is not worth the candle.”216 
In this way, both aspects of the Ventris ruling—that the Sixth 
Amendment is violated at the time of the uncounseled pretrial 
interrogation, but that a resulting statement can be used to impeach a 
testifying defendant—can be explained by notions of “fair play.” It is 
not fair to allow the government to try to secretly interrogate a 
represented defendant after charges have been filed, just as it is not fair 
for the defendant to be able to take the stand and contradict his past 
statements, even when those statements cannot be used against him in 
the government’s case-in-chief. 
B.  Montejo v. Louisiana: After Erasing Michigan v. Jackson, a Blank 
Slate Remains 
The Court’s third interrogation decision in the October 2008 term, 
Montejo v. Louisiana, was also its most significant. In Montejo, the 
                                                                                                                     
 214. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225–26 (1971) (citations omitted). 
 215. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. at 1846 (quoting Walder, 347 U.S. at 65) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 216. Id. 
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Court overruled Michigan v. Jackson, a 1986 decision which held that 
once a defendant invoked the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at an 
arraignment or similar proceeding, the police were prohibited from 
initiating any interrogation of that defendant.217 The most notable 
consequence of this decision is how wide open Sixth Amendment 
interrogation doctrine has become now that Jackson has been overruled. 
Clearly, Montejo allows police to approach a charged, represented 
defendant outside the presence of counsel and seek a waiver.218 But the 
ruling may actually go much further—it clears the ground for the Court 
to hold in the future that police may return again and again to try and 
interrogate that defendant, even if he invokes his right to counsel at 
every turn. It is far from clear that the Court will go so far, but nothing 
in Montejo precludes that route. In one decision, the Roberts Court has 
opened up Sixth Amendment interrogation law wider than it has been in 
over twenty-five years.  
While Montejo swept away most of Sixth Amendment interrogation 
law, the opinion consistently invokes a concern also articulated by the 
Court in Shatzer: the problem of police badgering suspects into waiving 
previously asserted rights. The Court’s concern (and in particular, 
Justice Kennedy’s concern) with police badgering—reflected both in 
Montejo and Shatzer—suggests that the Court may well create some 
sort of Edwards-like rule in the Sixth Amendment context, one that 
would prevent police from continually re-approaching represented 
suspects to seek waivers.  
The case began when police arrested Jesse Montejo on September 6, 
2002, in connection with a robbery and murder. Montejo waived his 
Miranda rights and eventually confessed to shooting the victim in the 
course of a burglary. On September 10, Montejo was brought before a 
Louisiana state judge for a preliminary hearing, where he was charged 
with murder, denied bond, and appointed a lawyer.219 
Later that day, police approached Montejo (before he had met with 
his lawyer) and asked him to go with them to help find the murder 
weapon. During the trip, he wrote a letter apologizing to the victim’s 
widow. At trial, the letter (along with his earlier confession) was 
admitted over defense objection. Montejo was convicted and sentenced 
to death.220 
On appeal, Montejo argued that police violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel—as articulated in Massiah and Michigan 
                                                                                                                     
 217. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2091 (2009); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 
625, 636 (1986). 
 218. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2090–91. 
 219. Id. at 2082. 
 220. Id. 
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v. Jackson221—by approaching him after he had been appointed 
counsel.222 As noted above, a defendant facing police interrogation has 
at least two potential sources of protection: Fifth Amendment 
protections under Miranda and Sixth Amendment protections under 
Massiah. 
In the Fifth Amendment context, the Court held in Edwards v. 
Arizona that if a suspect invokes his right to counsel, interrogation must 
cease and police are prohibited from re-initiating a later interrogation.223 
In the Sixth Amendment context, the Court in Michigan v. Jackson 
created an Edwards-type rule, holding that “if police initiate 
interrogation after a defendant’s assertion, at an arraignment or similar 
proceeding, of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant’s right 
to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid.”224 
Montejo argued that once counsel had been appointed, the Jackson 
rule applied and the inculpatory letter of apology had to be 
suppressed.225 The Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed, holding that 
Jackson protections applied only once a charged defendant 
affirmatively requested counsel, which Montejo had not done, even 
though counsel had already been appointed.226  
The United States Supreme Court resolved this dilemma—whether 
Jackson applied to any represented defendant, or only to defendants 
who had requested counsel—by overruling Jackson entirely.227 The 
majority’s first step toward overruling Jackson was its conclusion that 
the Louisiana Supreme Court’s “assertion” approach “would lead either 
to an unworkable standard, or to arbitrary and anomalous distinctions 
between defendants in different States[,] neither [of which] would be 
acceptable.”228 This first step was easy to take, because Montejo, his 
amicus supporters, and the dissent all agreed that requiring a defendant 
to affirmatively assert his right to counsel would be an unworkable or 
arbitrary system.229 In a number of other states, “the appointment of 
                                                                                                                     
 221. 475 U.S. 625, 626, 635 (1986). 
 222. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2082–83. 
 223. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981). 
 224. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636. 
 225. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2082–83. 
 226. State v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238, 1260–61 (La. 2008) (citing State v. Carter, 664 So. 
2d 367, 383 (La. 1995); and Montoya v. Collins, 955 F.2d 279, 282–83 (5th Cir. 1992)). Most 
jurisdictions had held that Jackson protections applied to any charged defendant for whom 
counsel had been appointed. See, e.g., Hellum v. Warden, 28 F.3d 903, 909 (8th Cir. 1994); 
Dew v. United States, 558 A.2d 1112, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1989); United States ex rel. Espinoza v. 
Fairman, 813 F.2d 117, 123 n.4 (7th Cir. 1987); Holloway v. State, 780 S.W.2d 787, 795 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1989) (en banc).  
 227. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2091. 
 228. Id. at 2083. 
 229. Id. at 2094 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Overruling Michigan v. Jackson at 16–17, Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (No. 07-1529), 
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counsel is automatic upon a finding of indigency, . . . sua sponte by the 
court.”230 Given that practice, the majority claimed that the Louisiana 
Supreme Court’s distinction “between defendants who ‘assert’ their 
right to counsel and those who do not . . . is exceedingly hazy.”231  
Having rejected the Louisiana “invocation” rule, the Court also 
rejected Montejo’s proposed rule: that Jackson prohibits the 
interrogation of any represented defendant, regardless of any “assertion” 
by the defendant. This approach, the Court reasoned, was “entirely 
untethered from the original rationale of Jackson,” which was to ensure 
police were prevented “from badgering a defendant into waiving his 
previously asserted Miranda rights.”232 When a defendant has never 
asserted that he needs counsel, “there is no basis for a presumption that 
any subsequent waiver of the right to counsel will be involuntary.”233  
The Montejo Court’s overruling of Jackson has dramatically opened 
up the doctrinal landscape. It is now unclear whether there is any 
Edwards-type rule in the Sixth Amendment context for a charged 
defendant not in custody. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Montejo 
provided no explicit reassurances that Edwards has any continuing 
application in the Sixth Amendment context. In Part III.A of the 
decision, in which Justice Scalia “emphasiz[ed] first what is not in 
dispute or at stake here,” he mentioned several still-valid Sixth 
Amendment principles, none of which are an Edwards-type rule.234 
Later, in Part IV, Justice Scalia again recounted the protections that still 
exist after the opinion, reciting the Fifth Amendment protections that 
will be available to at least those defendants being interrogated in 
custody.235 Justice Scalia acknowledged that:  
Montejo also correctly observes that the Miranda-Edwards 
regime is narrower than Jackson in one respect: The former 
applies only in the context of custodial interrogation. If the 
defendant is not in custody then those decisions do not 
apply; nor do they govern other, noninterrogative types of 
interactions between the defendant and the State (like 
pretrial lineups).236  
At this point, Justice Scalia could have assuaged Montejo’s (and the 
defense bar’s) concern by stating that an analogous Edwards rule would 
                                                                                                                     
2009 WL 1019983, at *16–17. 
 230. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2083 (majority opinion) (citations omitted). 
 231. Id. at 2084. 
 232. Id. at 2085 (quoting Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 233. Id. at 2086. 
 234. Id. at 2085. 
 235. Id. at 2090.  
 236. Id. 
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apply in the Sixth Amendment context once a defendant who has been 
approached by police invokes his right to counsel, prohibiting police 
from re-approaching that same defendant. But Justice Scalia did not 
provide that reassurance. Instead, he explained why Edwards-like 
protection might be unnecessary for the Sixth Amendment:  
[T]hose uncovered situations are the least likely to pose a 
risk of coerced waivers. When a defendant is not in 
custody, he is in control, and need only shut his door or 
walk away to avoid police badgering. And noninterrogative 
interactions with the State do not involve the ‘inherently 
compelling pressures’ that one might reasonably fear could 
lead to involuntary waivers.237  
Thus, Edwards is needed in the Fifth Amendment context of the 
compelling pressures of custodial interrogation because of the captive 
defendant’s unique susceptibility to police badgering. In Sixth 
Amendment noncustodial interrogation settings, however, neither of 
these concerns applies.  
In sum, the Montejo Court asserted that Jackson was concerned only 
with the problem of police “badgering” a suspect in custodial 
interrogation into waiving her rights even though she previously 
asserted them. The Court also suggested this “badgering” concern might 
not apply at all in the Sixth Amendment context. The Court trod very 
carefully in overruling Jackson, with the result that Sixth Amendment 
interrogation law is now wide open and uncertain. 
1.  Of “Fair Play” and Badgers: Preventing Police from Asking Suspects 
to Give Up Previously Invoked Rights 
As argued above, Montejo swept away much of Sixth Amendment 
interrogation law. And Montejo did not replace Jackson with any 
Edwards-type rule for the Sixth Amendment context, a rule that would 
prohibit police from continually approaching represented defendants 
even after they have asserted their rights in the first interrogation 
attempt. While Montejo carefully sidestepped creating such a rule, the 
decision also gives some reason to believe the Court may do so at some 
future point.  
Throughout the Court’s discussion of why the Jackson rule is 
unnecessary, the Court at several times noted other rules—such as 
Edwards—that “prevent police from badgering a defendant into 
waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.”238 The Court explained 
that the Edwards rule, which prohibits police from re-approaching a 
                                                                                                                     
 237. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)).  
 238. Id. at 2085 (quoting Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
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defendant who has previously asserted his right to counsel, “protect[s] a 
suspect’s voluntary choice not to speak outside his lawyer’s 
presence.”239 The Court overruled Jackson in part because the rule did 
not, like Edwards, simply protect the suspect’s own choice. If the 
defendant (like Montejo himself) had never invoked his right to counsel 
in the first place, applying the Jackson prohibition was unwarranted:   
No reason exists to assume that a defendant like Montejo, 
who has done nothing at all to express his intentions with 
respect to his Sixth Amendment rights, would not be 
perfectly amenable to speaking with the police without 
having counsel present. And no reason exists to prohibit the 
police from inquiring.240  
Notably, the majority’s reasoning here echoes that of Justice 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Texas v. Cobb241 (quoted in part 
above). In Cobb, the Court held that Sixth Amendment interrogation 
rights are “offense specific.”242 In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy 
(joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas) cast doubt on Michigan v. 
Jackson. Justice Kennedy explained that  
[I]t is difficult to understand the utility of a Sixth 
Amendment rule [Michigan v. Jackson] that operates to 
invalidate a confession given by the free choice of suspects 
who have received proper advice of their Miranda rights 
but waived them nonetheless. The Miranda rule and the 
related preventative rule of Edwards . . . serve to protect a 
suspect’s voluntary choice not to speak outside his lawyer’s 
presence. The parallel rule announced in Jackson, however, 
supersedes the suspect’s voluntary choice to speak with 
investigators.243  
Justice Kennedy argued that the Court “ought to question the wisdom of 
a judge-made preventative rule to protect a suspect’s desire not to speak 
when it cannot be shown that he had that intent.”244  
Thus, Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Cobb, like the 
majority opinion in Montejo, finds its primary fault with Jackson 
because it may actually interfere with a defendant who is willing to 
confess to police outside the presence of counsel. For a defendant who 
has informed police, at the first attempted interrogation, that he only 
                                                                                                                     
 239. Id. at 2085–86 (quoting Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 175 (2001) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 240. Id. at 2086–87. 
 241.  532 U.S. 162 (2001). 
 242.  Id. at 167–68 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991)). 
 243. Id. at 174–75 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 244. Id. at 176.  
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wants to speak in counsel’s presence, this fault no longer applies. 
Rather, continued attempts to elicit confessions create the danger that 
police pressure—badgering, as the Court likes to call it—will induce a 
defendant to speak when he really wants to rely on counsel. 
Throughout Montejo, the Court repeatedly emphasized that the 
original rationale of Jackson’s rule “is to preclude the State from 
badgering defendants into waiving their previously asserted rights.”245 
The Court noted that “[t]he effect of this badgering might be to coerce a 
waiver, which would render the subsequent interrogation a violation of 
the Sixth Amendment.”246  
While the Court spoke carefully in Montejo and did not commit 
itself to any Edwards-type rule in the Sixth Amendment context, the 
rhetorical choice of the term “badgering” is itself revealing. One could 
easily use other terms to describe what police do when they re-approach 
a suspect, who has previously invoked her rights, to re-ask that suspect 
to waive her rights. Perhaps the police are simply “asking” the suspect 
to “reconsider.” But the Court in both Shatzer and Montejo repeatedly 
described this behavior with the pejorative term “badgering.”247 So long 
as the Court continues to employ the rhetoric of “badgering,” it seems 
likely that the Court will fashion rules limiting or prohibiting the 
practice.  
2.  New Rules for “Fair Play” in Sixth Amendment Interrogation Law: 
Thompkins Will Apply, but Shatzer Will Not 
Now that Montejo has cleared away much of the Sixth Amendment 
doctrinal landscape, several questions arise, in particular whether the 
Court will apply, in the Sixth Amendment context, various rules it has 
articulated under the Fifth Amendment. Two doctrines that come to 
mind are the Thompkins ruling, effectively eliminating any affirmatively 
“waiver” component to the Miranda “warnings and waiver” regime, and 
the Shatzer ruling, permitting police to re-approach suspects who have 
previously invoked their rights after a fourteen-day break in custody. 
Will the Court apply these doctrines to the Sixth Amendment context? I 
predict that under the Court’s “fair play” approach to interrogation law, 
the Court will apply Thompkins in the Sixth Amendment context, but 
will not apply Shatzer.  
a. Sixth Amendment Waivers: Thompkins Will Apply 
As noted above, in Berghuis v. Thompkins, the Court held that a 
                                                                                                                     
 245. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2089. The majority uses the term “badger” (or a variation 
thereof) ten times in its opinion. See id. at 2085–87, 2089–90.  
 246. Id. at 2089. 
 247. Id. at 2085–87, 2089–90; Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1220–21 (2010). 
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suspect’s inculpatory statement, given after the suspect received and 
understood the Miranda warnings, constitute a valid waiver of her Fifth 
Amendment rights.248 On its face, Thompkins applies only to the Fifth 
Amendment, but courts will soon be asked to determine whether the 
same waiver rule applies to a defendant protected by Sixth Amendment 
rights rather than Fifth Amendment rights. Using what I have identified 
as the Court’s “fair play” approach to interrogation law, there is every 
reason to think the Court will apply the Thompkins rule equally in the 
Sixth Amendment context.  
Thompkins makes the most sense if one assumes that the purpose of 
Miranda is to provide a suspect with “fair notice” of his rights, not to 
actually dispel the coercion of the interrogation room.249 The same logic 
applies in the Sixth Amendment context. When police seek to 
interrogate a defendant who has been indicted and is represented by 
counsel, “fair notice” requires that the police notify the defendant of his 
rights to remain silent and to speak only in the presence of his attorney. 
If anything, the Thompkins approach to waiver is easier to justify in the 
Sixth Amendment context than in the Fifth Amendment context. After 
all, Fifth Amendment interrogations occur in the unique context of 
custodial interrogation; Miranda was originally concerned with 
dispelling the inherent coercion in custodial interrogation.250 Sixth 
Amendment interrogations, in contrast, do not necessarily occur in 
custody—the Sixth Amendment applies once the suspect has been 
indicted and is represented by counsel. Thus, the Court has even less 
concern (perhaps no concern at all) with dispelling potential coercion. 
As Justice Scalia noted in Montejo:  
[Sixth Amendment interrogations] are the least likely to 
pose a risk of coerced waivers. When a defendant is not in 
custody, he is in control, and need only shut his door or 
walk away to avoid police badgering. And noninterrogative 
interactions with the State do not involve the ‘inherently 
compelling pressures,’ that one might reasonably fear could 
lead to involuntary waivers.251 
Thus in Thompkins, the Court found that the simple act of speaking 
was sufficient (given a warning and a presumed understanding thereof) 
to constitute a waiver of the suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights, 
notwithstanding the inherently compelling pressures of the interrogation 
room. In the Sixth Amendment context, the Court has noted that those 
“inherently compelling pressures” are not present, so there is even less 
                                                                                                                     
 248. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2262–63 (2010). 
 249. See supra Subsection I.A.3. 
 250. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 (1966). 
 251. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2090 (citation omitted) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467). 
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reason to be concerned that a defendant’s choice to speak is 
involuntary.252 In short, the logic of Thompkins applies with even 
greater force in the context of Sixth Amendment interrogations. Under 
the Court’s “fair play” approach to interrogations, police must inform 
criminal defendants of their right to remain silent and right to counsel 
when police approach them outside the presence of counsel. Assuming 
this “fair notice” has been provided, however, the defendant from then 
on speaks at his own risk; answers to questions will most likely be 
deemed to be waivers of his Sixth Amendment rights. 
b.  Sixth Amendment Invocations: Shatzer Should Not Apply 
In Shatzer v. Maryland, the Court created an expiration date for 
invocations of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel: after a suspect in 
custodial interrogation invokes her right to counsel, police must cease 
questioning and cannot re-approach that suspect until fourteen days 
after release from Miranda custody.253 In the context of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, as opposed to the Fifth Amendment right 
to counsel at issue in Shatzer, the question of when an Edwards 
invocation ended never arose. Under Michigan v. Jackson, police could 
not even approach a represented defendant outside the presence of 
counsel to try to discuss the charged offense, as long as the defendant 
had asserted his right to counsel.254 Most courts interpreted Jackson’s 
prohibition to apply to any represented, charged defendant.255 Under 
that rule, there was no need to ask how “long” an initial invocation 
lasted: given the rule prohibiting police from approaching a defendant 
in the first instance, the question of when they might re-approach 
                                                                                                                     
 252. Id. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467). 
 253. See supra Section I.B. 
 254. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986). 
 255. See United States v. Harrison, 213 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A] defendant 
invokes the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as a matter of law when (1) the defendant retains 
counsel on an ongoing basis to assist with a pending criminal investigation, (2) the government 
knows, or should know, that the defendant has ongoing legal representation relating to the 
subject of that investigation, and (3) the eventual indictment brings charges precisely anticipated 
by the scope of the pre-indictment investigation.”); Hellum v. Warden, 28 F.3d 903, 909 (8th 
Cir. 1994) (stating that for represented, charged defendant, “[t]here is no doubt that Hellum’s 
right to counsel had attached and been invoked prior to his . . . subsequent interrogation”); Dew 
v. United States, 558 A.2d 1112, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[W]e see little, if any, room for an 
argument that the Supreme Court would permit a police-initiated request for a post-indictment 
waiver of counsel by a represented defendant, except through defense counsel.”); United States 
ex rel. Espinoza v. Fairman, 813 F.2d 117, 123 n.4 (7th Cir. 1987) (concluding that there was no 
difference, for purposes of triggering protections, between asserting right to counsel at 
arraignment versus merely accepting counsel); State v. Boorigie, 41 P.3d 764, 775 (Kan. 2002) 
(same); Holloway v. State, 780 S.W.2d 787, 795 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); State v. Dagnall, 612 
N.W.2d 680, 695 (Wis. 2000) (defendant “did not have to ‘invoke’ his Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel because he . . . had an attorney”). 
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simply did not arise.  
In the wake of Montejo, courts will now be called upon to determine 
what happens when a charged, represented defendant is approached by 
police for (noncustodial) interrogation and that defendant invokes the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. One obvious option is to rely on 
Shatzer and to adopt a fourteen-day break rule before reinterrogation is 
permitted. For the reasons explained below, this approach should be 
rejected; there is no reason to create any “expiration date” for 
invocations of Sixth Amendment rights, because unlike Fifth 
Amendment invocations, Sixth Amendment invocations are more 
limited in scope and have a built-in expiration date. 
Notwithstanding the similarity between the Fifth Amendment right 
to counsel (in custodial interrogations) and the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel (after the defendant has been charged), the Court has 
consistently created different rules for these two amendments. Most 
notably, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific: it 
applies only to the offense or offenses with which the defendant has 
actually been charged.256 Putting aside Fifth Amendment protections 
(which apply only in custodial interrogations), the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel only protects defendants with respect to the charged 
crime(s). Police can attempt to interrogate the defendant outside of 
custody for other uncharged crimes, and need not provide any warnings. 
And if the defendant invokes her Sixth Amendment right to counsel as 
to the charged crimes, police can still try to interrogate her for other 
uncharged crimes.257 
The Fifth Amendment, in contrast, is not offense-specific: it applies 
to all police attempts to interrogate a suspect about any offense. Thus, a 
suspect in custody must be given Miranda warnings before any 
interrogation, no matter whether the interrogation relates to the crime 
for which he was taken into custody or for some other possible offense. 
And when a suspect invokes his Fifth Amendment right to counsel 
during a custodial interrogation, police cannot attempt to interrogate 
him about some other matter.258 
The Shatzer rule was created in response to this unique feature of 
Fifth Amendment invocations. Because Fifth Amendment rights are not 
tied to any particular offense, a suspect’s invocation of Fifth 
Amendment rights potentially lasts forever, and as to all crimes: once a 
suspect has invoked her right to counsel during one custodial 
interrogation, police are potentially barred from ever attempting to re-
                                                                                                                     
 256. Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167–68 (2001); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 
175 (1991). 
 257. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 173–74; McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178. 
 258. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 
675, 683–84 (1988); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–86 (1981). 
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interrogate her, even about some wholly unrelated crime years later. 
Without some “expiration” of the sort created in Shatzer, Justice Alito’s 
extreme hypothetical could occur: a suspect who invoked his right to 
counsel in Maryland in a 1999 interrogation for suspected joy riding 
could not be questioned in 2009 for a murder in Montana.259  
Because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not share this 
feature of Fifth Amendment law, no Shatzer-type expiration rule is 
required. In the Sixth Amendment context, a defendant’s invocation of 
the right to counsel does not prohibit any future police interrogation; it 
merely prohibits future police interrogation related to the specific 
offense or offenses with which the defendant has already been charged. 
This means the invocation is limited in both scope and time.  
First, as to scope, the invocation only applies to the charged 
offenses. If police want to ask the defendant about uncharged offenses, 
they are free to do so, even after the defendant has invoked her Sixth 
Amendment rights.  
Second, as to time, the invocation of Sixth Amendment rights is 
limited by the natural life of the existing criminal prosecution. Once the 
defendant is either convicted (through a guilty plea or conviction after 
trial) or acquitted, the Sixth Amendment prohibition presumably ends; 
because the prohibition is tied to the pending offense, once the offense 
is no longer pending, the prohibition also disappears. 
Thus, in the Sixth Amendment context, the Shatzer fourteen-day rule 
is a solution in search of a problem. In the Sixth Amendment context, 
there is no “eternal invocation” problem: the invocation of the right to 
counsel only applies to the offense charged, and that prohibition ends 
once the charged offense is terminated through conviction, acquittal, or 
dismissal of charges. 
In addition to being unnecessary, the Shatzer rule is also undesirable 
in the Sixth Amendment context. The Shatzer rule states that police may 
re-approach a suspect who has invoked his right to counsel fourteen 
days after a release from Miranda custody.260 In the Sixth Amendment 
context, the suspect need not even be in custody in the first place. Thus, 
the Shatzer rule would turn into a simple fourteen-day rule: once a 
represented defendant invokes his right to counsel, police may re-
approach him fourteen days later to again attempt to interrogate him 
outside the presence of counsel. Because the defendant need not be in 
“custody,” that part of Shatzer no longer applies. Assuming the Court 
creates any type of Edwards protection for the Sixth Amendment 
context—any rule prohibiting police from badgering a defendant into 
reneging on her previous invocation of the right to counsel—it would be 
                                                                                                                     
 259. Shatzer Transcript, supra note 116, at 31–32. 
 260. Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1223 (2010). 
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strange to place a two-week expiration date on that protection. Once a 
criminal suspect has been charged and become a criminal defendant, his 
need for counsel’s assistance is heightened.261 In that context, a 
defendant who tells police, upon being approached for interrogation, 
that he wants to deal with them only through counsel, should be 
protected against any further police badgering. 
Thus, the Shatzer fourteen-day rule is both unnecessary and 
undesirable in the context of Sixth Amendment invocations. Unlike 
Thompkins, which likely applies in the Sixth Amendment context as 
well as the Fifth, Shatzer should be limited to the Fifth Amendment 
context in which it is needed. 
III.  THE “FAIR PLAY” MODEL: FAULTY PREMISES MAKE FOR BAD 
DOCTRINE   
Parts I and II described how the Roberts Court interrogation 
decisions are reshaping both Fifth and Sixth Amendment interrogation 
rules toward the underlying principle of “fair play” in interrogations. 
Part III evaluates that change.  
The core problem with the Roberts Court’s “fair play” principle is 
that, as the Court applies it in the cases discussed herein, it presupposes 
an interrogation suspect who is autonomous, competent, and 
empowered to protect his interests. The “fair play” model represents a 
rejection of the Warren Court’s description of the problem: that 
individuals undergoing police interrogation face inherent compulsions 
that threaten to “exact[] a heavy toll on individual liberty and trade[] on 
the weakness of individuals.”262 The Warren Court’s solution to this 
problem, in the form of the Miranda and Massiah rules for 
interrogation, have been long criticized from both the right and the 
left.263 But the diagnosis itself—that suspects facing police interrogation 
are vulnerable to abuse and overreaching—has proven robust, supported 
by a growing body of experiential and empirical research.264 Thus, the 
Roberts Court’s “fair play” principle for interrogation, which 
presupposes autonomous suspects who do not need protection from 
inherent pressures, does not match the state of the evidence. 
First, the ongoing trend of DNA exonerations by convicts, including 
a number who falsely confessed to their crimes, has proven that 
suspects in interrogation are more susceptible to false confession than 
                                                                                                                     
 261. This is evident from, among other things, the fact that the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel mandates governmental provision of counsel after the defendant has been charged, but 
not before. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335, 344 (1963). 
 262. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455, 458 (1966). 
 263. See supra note 17. 
 264. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. 
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had previously been thought possible.265 Many people, including judges 
and jurors, have long shared a commonsense belief that an innocent 
person would not confess to a serious crime except under circumstances 
of extreme duress, such as prolonged torture.266 Repeated 
exonerations—either by DNA or by the identification of the true guilty 
party—of convicts who confessed to serious crimes show that this 
commonsense belief is inaccurate, and false confessions are more 
common than we intuitively would guess.267 Thus, “[t]here is a new 
awareness among scholars, legislators, courts, prosecutors, police 
departments, and the public that innocent people falsely confess, often 
due to psychological pressure placed upon them during police 
interrogations.”268 The Roberts Court’s “fair play” rules presuppose that 
suspects in interrogation are autonomous agents capable of looking out 
for their own interests, not inherently vulnerable to police pressures. 
That is to say, the “fair play” rules reflect the commonsense belief that 
innocent persons would not falsely confess except under extreme 
duress, and thus do not need any special protections from police 
pressures. Mounting evidence shows this commonsense belief is false, 
and re-affirms the Warren Court’s assumption that suspects in 
interrogation are more vulnerable to police pressure than many of us 
intuitively believe.    
Second, empirical psychological studies have provided coherent 
explanations for this phenomenon. Professor Brandon L. Garrett 
explains that “[s]cholars increasingly study the psychological 
techniques that can cause people to falsely confess and have 
documented how such techniques were used in instances of known false 
confessions.”269 Indeed, “psychologists have known that people are 
highly responsive to reinforcement and subject to the laws of 
conditioning, and that behavior is influenced more by perceptions of 
                                                                                                                     
 265. See Steven A Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the 
Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 904–06 (2004) (“[S]tudies report that the number of 
false confessions range from 8–25% of the total miscarriages of justices studied, thus 
establishing the problem of false confessions as a leading cause of wrongful convictions of the 
innocent in America.”). 
 266. This commonsense belief is typified by John Henry Wigmore’s claim that false 
confessions were “scarcely conceivable,” “of the rarest occurrence,” and that “[n]o trustworthy 
figures of authenticated instances exist . . . .” 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE 
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 835, 867 (2d ed. 1923); 
see also Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 
34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 6, 24 (2010) (“[M]ost people reasonably believe that they would 
never confess to a crime they did not commit and have only rudimentary understanding of the 
predispositional and situational factors that would lead someone to do so.”). 
 267. See Drizin & Leo, supra note 265, at 904–06. 
 268. Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 
1052–53 (2010). 
 269. Id. at 1053. 
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short-term than long-term consequences.”270 Additionally, psychologists 
have determined “that individuals are highly vulnerable to influence 
from change agents who seek their compliance.”271 In particular, 
suspects in interrogation are vulnerable to identified psychological tools 
relating to “attitudes and persuasion, informational and normative 
influences, the use of sequential request strategies, . . . and the gradual 
escalation of commands, issued by figures of authority, to effectively 
obtain self- and other-defeating acts of obedience.”272 Custodial 
interrogation exploits established psychological problems with 
“memory transience, misattribution effects, suggestibility, and bias.”273  
In short, the Roberts Court’s presumption that suspects in 
interrogation are autonomous agents capable of protecting their own 
interests is wrong. The resulting rules of “fair play” in interrogation fail 
to adequately protect the constitutional right against self-incrimination 
and the guarantee of the assistance of counsel in all criminal cases. If 
one accepts the premise that the privilege against compelled self-
incrimination applies to custodial interrogation, then the Roberts 
Court’s refusal to acknowledge the serious compulsions inherent in 
custodial interrogation is wrongheaded. The Court has offered no 
convincing rebuttal of that basic premise; it has just slowly and steadily 
marginalized it. 
The Court’s model “works” only by presupposing a population that 
approaches the police with an attitude of suspicion and contempt, rather 
than respect and reasonable deference. If the population exhibits the 
attitude toward the police that the Court would likely expect and 
desire—namely an attitude of respect and reasonable deference to 
authority—then the Court’s model will result in that population 
consistently and predictably making poor choices in custodial 
interrogation, and succumbing to the inherent pressures of the 
interrogation room. Ironically, recent studies have suggested that 
“innocence itself may put innocents at risk.”274 This happens because 
“people who stand falsely accused tend to believe that truth and justice 
will prevail and that their innocence will become transparent to 
investigators, juries, and others[,]” and thus, such innocents “cooperate 
fully with police, often failing to realize that they are suspects not 
witnesses.” 275  
If the Court’s “fair play” principle rests on unrealistic assumptions 
                                                                                                                     
 270. Kassin et al., supra note 266, at 15.  
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. (citations omitted).  
 273. Id.   
 274. Id. at 22 (citing Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence 
Put Innocents at Risk?, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 215, 223–24 (2005)). 
 275. Id. at 22–23 (citing Kassin, supra note 266, at 224). 
51
Witmer-Rich: Interrogation and the Roberts Court
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
1240 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
about human behavior in interrogation, why is the Court shaping 
interrogation law along these misguided lines? The “fair play” model 
allows the Court to shape Miranda and related interrogation rules to 
facilitate police interrogation and the use of confessions in criminal 
cases, by providing a “safe harbor” for police.276 So long as police 
satisfy the requirements of the Court’s relatively clear and police-
friendly interrogation rules, police interrogation techniques will not be 
overly scrutinized, and the resulting confession will very likely be 
admissible.  
By reformulating the Miranda rules under the “fair play” rubric, the 
Roberts Court has made it much easier for police to reach that safe 
harbor. Through Powell, which required only “fair notice” of rights 
rather than clear evidence that the suspect comprehends and appreciates 
her rights, the Court imposed a relatively simple requirement on police 
(recite some version of the warnings) instead of the more difficult task 
of ensuring that a possibly uneducated, scared, defensive, or confused 
suspect truly comprehends her rights in the interrogation setting. 
Through Thompkins, the Court removed a barrier that might prevent 
police from reaching the Miranda safe harbor, by eliminating the 
requirement that police elicit a distinct waiver from the suspect separate 
from and before any admissible confession. Thus, Thompkins makes the 
“safe harbor” less dependent on what the suspect does or fails to do, and 
more within the exclusive realm of police following the required 
procedures. 
Shatzer limited the damage to police interrogation done by a 
suspect’s successful invocation of the right to counsel, by allowing 
police to return after a fourteen-day break in Miranda custody. The 
majority created for police a clear (and not very onerous) time limitation 
of two weeks, permitting police to again try to reach the Miranda safe 
harbor. The majority was wholly unconcerned with Justice Stevens’ 
objection that by failing to actually provide the suspect with counsel 
during that two-week period, the police have effectively misled the 
suspect and potentially caused the suspect to understand that her rights 
are illusory.277 The suspect is told, “You have a right to a lawyer during 
                                                                                                                     
 276. See FRIED, supra note 9, at 45 (“[M]ost professional law-enforcement organizations 
had learned to live with Miranda, and even to love it, to the extent that it provided them with a 
safe harbor . . . .”); Klein, supra note 9, at 1033 (“[A] ‘constitutional safe harbor rule’ is a 
judicially created procedure that, if properly followed by the government actor, insulates the 
government from the argument that the constitutional clause at issue was violated.”). 
 277. Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1225 (2010); id. at 1229 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“When police tell an indigent suspect that he has the right to an 
attorney, that he is not required to speak without an attorney present, and that an attorney will be 
provided to him at no cost before questioning, the police have made a significant promise. If 
they cease questioning and then reinterrogate the suspect 14 days later without providing him 
with a lawyer, the suspect is likely to feel that the police lied to him and that he really does not 
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this interrogation.” The suspect responds, “Okay, I want a lawyer during 
my interrogation.” Police then leave, and no lawyer is provided—even 
if the suspect keeps asking his jailers, “Can I get a lawyer? The cops 
told me I could have one.” Two weeks later, police again show up, 
without a lawyer, and ask to interrogate the suspect, again warning him 
that he has a right to a lawyer—the same right he previously invoked, 
and the same request which did not result in a lawyer being provided. 
The reasonable message received by the unsophisticated inmate could 
well be that the promise of a lawyer is illusory and that police will recite 
certain warnings but not follow through on their promises.278 
The point here is that the majority’s rule in Shatzer is simply not 
designed to ensure that a suspect understands her rights and is 
sufficiently empowered to protect those rights during the custodial 
interrogation. Rather, the rule created clear, easily met rules that police 
can follow to reach the Miranda safe harbor. 
The Sixth Amendment rules, after Montejo, are far less clear than the 
Fifth Amendment rules; thus, it is more difficult to make definitive 
evaluations of the Court’s approach—much of its approach remains to 
be seen. At a minimum, Montejo’s overruling of Michigan v. Jackson 
begins to create space for police to successfully interrogate charged, 
represented defendants. Montejo gives the Court the space to craft “safe 
harbor” rules for police-initiated interrogation in the Sixth Amendment 
context, as it has done in the Fifth Amendment context. Whether the 
Court will actually do so remains to be seen. 
In Ventris, the Court clarified that when police violate the Sixth 
Amendment interrogation rules (the content of which are still largely 
uncertain), the violation occurs at the time of interrogation, not when 
the statement is later used at trial. Rather than create a “safe harbor” 
rule, the Court in Ventris continued its trend of reducing the 
consequences for police when they do violate constitutional 
interrogation rules—thereby permitting some use of confessions 
obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment.  
If the Roberts Court’s “fair play” rules are flawed, what 
interrogation rules should the Court be creating? The central flaw in the 
Roberts Court approach to interrogation is that it rests on faulty 
assumptions about how suspects behave in interrogations. The best way 
forward is to create interrogation rules based on what current research 
tells us about interrogation. A good start is articulated by Professor Saul 
                                                                                                                     
have any right to a lawyer.”). 
 278. The sophisticated suspect will realize that the warning, “You have a right to an 
attorney during this interrogation,” really means, “If you tell us you want a lawyer, we will stop 
interrogating you,”—not that a lawyer will in fact be provided. But of course the latter 
message—that the right to a lawyer is instead, in practice, the right to terminate the 
interrogation—is not part of the required Miranda warnings. 
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M. Kassin and his co-authors in their recent article, Police-Induced 
Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations.279 Those 
recommendations include:  
1. Videotape custodial interrogations: “all custodial 
interviews and interrogations of felony suspects should be 
videotaped in their entirety and with a camera angle that 
focuses equally on the suspect and interrogator.”280  
2. Shift from a “confrontational” model of 
interrogation—where guilt is presumed and the sole aim is 
to elicit a confession—to an “investigative” model of 
interrogation—where police do not presume guilt but 
instead seek to obtain information about crimes.281 
3. Limit the time a suspect is interrogated and held in 
isolation.282 
4. Ban or limit police ability to lie or present false 
evidence to a suspect in interrogation, given research 
indicating “that outright lies can put innocents at risk to 
confess by leading them to feel trapped by the inevitability 
of evidence against them.”283 
5. Ban or more strictly regulate the strategy of 
“minimization”—in which police imply leniency for a 
suspect who confesses—in light of research showing “that 
implicit promises can put innocents at risk to confess by 
leading them to perceive that the only way to lessen or 
escape punishment is by complying with the interrogator’s 
demand for confession.”284 
                                                                                                                     
 279. Kassin et al., supra note 266. 
 280. Id. at 25 (emphasis omitted). 
 281. Id. at 27–28. 
 282. Id. at 28. 
 283. Id. at 28–29 (noting evidence of this problem consists of: “(1) the aggregation of 
actual false confession cases, many of which involved use of the false evidence ploy; (2) one 
hundred-plus years of basic psychology research, which proves without equivocation that 
misinformation can substantially alter people’s visual perceptions, beliefs, motivations, 
emotions, attitudes, memories, self-assessments, and even certain physiological outcomes, as 
seen in studies of the placebo effect; and (3) numerous experiments, from different laboratories, 
demonstrating that presentations of false evidence increase the rate at which innocent research 
participants agree to confess to prohibited acts they did not commit.”). 
 284. Id. at 29–30 (evidence of this problem consists of: “(1) the aggregation of actual false 
confession cases, the vast majority of which involved the use of minimization or explicit 
promises of leniency; (2) basic psychological research indicating, first, that people are highly 
responsive to reinforcement and make choices designed to maximize their outcomes, and second 
that people can infer certain consequences in the absence of explicit promises and threats by 
pragmatic implication; and (3) experiments specifically demonstrating that minimization 
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6. Protect particularly vulnerable suspects, such as 
“juveniles and people who are cognitively impaired or 
psychologically disordered.”285 
The central purpose of this Article is to identify the underlying 
principle driving the Roberts Court’s reshaping of constitutional 
interrogation law, not to articulate the best set of interrogation rules a 
court or legislature could create. Therefore, while the suggestions above 
from a group of experts are certainly a good start, my purpose is not to 
fully endorse any particular set of rules.  
CONCLUSION 
The Roberts Court’s constitutional interrogation decisions show 
hostility towards the Warren Court’s deep concern for protecting 
vulnerable suspects from the coercion of interrogation. Instead, the 
Roberts Court is reshaping interrogation rules toward the concept of 
“fair play” in interrogations, a rubric which presupposes interrogation 
suspects as autonomous agents capable of actively protecting their own 
interests and expected to do so. This underlying assumption, however, is 
unfounded and inconsistent with a steadily growing body of experience 
(in the form of DNA exonerations of convicts who confessed) and 
empirical research. Because the Court’s foundational premise is wrong, 
its resulting rules of “fair play” in interrogation fail to adequately 
protect the constitutional right against self-incrimination and the 
guarantee of the assistance of counsel in criminal cases. 
                                                                                                                     
increases the rate at which research participants infer leniency in punishment and confess, even 
if they are innocent” (citations omitted)). 
 285. Id. at 30. 
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